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Department of Revenue v. Kurth Ranch:
Double Jeopardy.

A: Multiple Punishment Component.
Q: What is Confusion?
Continuing Where Halper and Austin Left

Off

INTRODUCTION

We have beenfighting the war on drugs, but now it seems
to me the attack is on the Constitution of the United
States.'
must be wrong here, and I suggest it is the
Something
2
Court.

In order to help finance the effort to eradicate the "evils" of marijuana,
state governments have increasingly looked to civil penalties, civil
forfeitures, criminal fines and the tax code. Although each of these "tools"
has been used in the war on drugs, the Supreme Court has recognized that
3
these sanctions are subject to constitutional constraints. Through the years,
the Supreme Court has attempted to define these constitutional constraints

1. Edward Walsh, House Votes Antidrug Legislation, WASH POST, Sept. 12, 1986, at
Al, A8 (quoting Peter W. Radino Jr., Chairman, House Judiciary Committee).
2. Rutan v. Republican Party of Illinois, 497 U.S. 62, 92 (1990) (Scalia, J.,
dissenting) (noting the majority's decision that Party membership should not be considered
when filling government jobs "will be enforced by a corps of Judges (the members of this
Court included) who overwhelmingly owe their office to its violation.").
3. Department of Revenue v. Kurth Ranch, 114 S. Ct. 1937, 1945 (1994).
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as they apply to civil penalties,4 civil forfeitures,5 criminal fines,6 and tax

statutes.7
In Kurth Ranch, the Supreme Court subjected a tax statute8 to double
jeopardy analysis for the first time.9 Although the Court held that the
Montana tax statute at issue violated the Double Jeopardy Clause of the
Fifth Amendment, 0 the majority did not provide a workable test for lower
courts to follow should future analysis become necessary. The majority's
lack of direction may create problems for the lower courts as at least
twenty-seven states have enacted excise taxes similar to the one at issue in
Kurth Ranch."
This casenote examines the Kurth Ranch decision. Part I of this
casenote explores the historical development and modem application of the
Double Jeopardy Clause.' The modem application portion focuses on the
4. See United States v. Halper, 490 U.S. 435 (1989) (holding that a civil penalty is
unconstitutional because it is so extreme and removed from the government's actual damages
that it constitutes punishment and thus violates the Double Jeopardy Clause).
5. See Austin v. United States, 113 S.Ct. 2801 (1993) (noting that the excessive fines
clause of the Eighth Amendment may preclude forfeiture of property). See also United
States v. James Daniel Good Real Property, 114 S.Ct. 492 (1993) (holding the government
may be held to have violated the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment if it does not
provide notice and an opportunity to be heard prior to civil forfeiture).
6. See International Union, United Mine Workers v. Bagwell. 114 S.Ct. 2552 (1993)
(holding that a criminal contempt fine is punitive and can only be imposed through criminal
proceedings, including the right to a jury trial).
7. See Marchetti v. United States, 390 U.S. 39 (1968) (holding Fifth Amendment
privilege against self-incrimination barred defendant's prosecution for violating federal
wagering tax statutes).
8. MONT. CODE ANN. §15-25-101 to 123 (1987).
9. Department of Revenue v. Kurth Ranch, 114 S.Ct. 1937, 1945 (1994). See also
id. at 1949 (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting) (noting "[w]e have never previously subjected a tax
statute to double jeopardy analysis . . .
10. Id. at 1948.
11. Brief for the States as Amicus Curiae at n. 1, Department of Revenue v. Kurth
Ranch, 114 S.Ct. 1937 (1994) (No. 93-144). Justice O'Connor noted that at least twentytwo states tax marijuana at approximately the same rate ($100 per ounce) as the tax at issue
in Kurth Ranch. Kurth Ranch, 114 S.Ct. at 1954 (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
12. It should be noted at the outset that the Supreme Court has had great difficulty in
developing a consistent interpretation of double jeopardy theory. Chief Justice Rehnquist
once noted "the decisional law in the area [double jeopardy] is a veritable Sargasso Sea
which could not fail to challenge the most intrepid judicial navigator." Albernaz v. United
States, 450 U.S. 333, 343 (1981). See also The Supreme Court, 1993 Term: Leading Cases,
108 HARV. L. REV. 139, 171 (1994) (noting that the Court's interpretation of the Double
Jeopardy Clause has long been the subject of "strong criticism"). See generally Honorable
Monroe G. McKay, Double Jeopardy: Are the Pieces the Puzzle?, 23 WASHBURN L.J. 1
(describing double jeopardy theory as a "perplexing puzzle"); George C. Thomas, III An
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Supreme Court's decision in United States v. Halper.3 Part II discusses
the facts and case history of Kurth Ranch, the Supreme Court's rejection of
the Halper rational relation test, and the basis of the majority decision and
the three dissenting opinions. Part III analyzes the various opinions and
explains how the majority erred when it utilized a multiple punishment test
to determine whether the assessment of the drug tax constituted a second
punishment. Part IV explores the practical implications of the Supreme
Court's decision that the assessment of a state's drug tax against a
defendant, who has been criminally punished, violated the Double Jeopardy
Clause.
I. OVERVIEW OF DOUBLE JEOPARDY JURISPRUDENCE
A. HISTORICAL DEVELOPMENT

The Double Jeopardy Clause is contained within the Fifth Amendment
and provides: "No person shall ... be subject for the same offense to be
twice put in jeopardy of life or limb . . . . ""' The origins of the Double
Jeopardy Clause can be traced back to Greek and Roman times. 5 In
addition, the Double Jeopardy Clause was a basic principle of English
common law long before the creation of the United States. 16 In Ex Parte
Lange 7 the court stated, "[i]f there is anything settled in the jurisprudence
of England and America, it is that no man can be twice lawfully punished
for the same offense."'" The basic underlying idea is that the state with all
of its financial resources and power, should not be allowed to continue to
try individuals over and over in hopes of obtaining an eventual conviction
(in the situation in which the individual has been previously acquitted) or

Elegant Theory of Double Jeopardy, 1988 U. ILL. L. REV. 827, 828 (noting "the proliferation
of case law and commentary has not produced a coherent theory to date").
13. The focus on Halper is necessary because the lower courts utilized the rational
relation test, first discussed in Halper,to find the Montana tax statute at issue in Kurth Ranch
unconstitutional.
14. U.S. CONST. amend. V.

15. Whalen v. United States, 445 U.S. 684, 699 (1980) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting)
(quoting Demosthenes who stated that "the laws forbid the same man to be tried twice on
the same issue ...." 1 Demosthenes 589 (. Vince trans., 4th ed. 1970)). See also Jay A.
Sigler, DOUBLE JEOPARDY THE DEVELOPMENT OF A LEGAL AND SOCIAL POLICY 2 (1969).
16. Sigler, supra note 15, at 3.
17. 85 U.S. (18 Wall.) 163 (1873).
18. Id. at 168.
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a conviction that may impose a harsher sentence (in the situation in which
the individual has already been convicted).' 9
However, while it was well recognized that the Double Jeopardy Clause
protected against prosecution for the same offense after either an acquittal
or a conviction, it was not until Ex Parte Lange that the Double Jeopardy
Clause was held to prohibit multiple punishments for the same offense.20
It is now well settled that the Double Jeopardy Clause protects against: 1)
a second prosecution for the same offense after acquittal; 2) a second
prosecution for a same offense after conviction; and 3) multiple punishment
for the same offense.2' Though the Double Jeopardy Clause is found in the
Fifth Amendment, it is enforceable against the States through the Fourteenth
Amendment.22
B. MODERN APPLICATION

Prior to Kurth Ranch, the Supreme Court had not addressed the specific
issue of whether a tax statute should be subjected to double jeopardy
analysis.23 However, the seeds for subjecting a tax statute to double
jeopardy analysis were planted early on. As early as 1869, the Court
recognized that "[t]he power to tax may be exercised oppressively upon

19. Green v. United States, 355 U.S. 184, 187-88 (1957).
20. Lange, 85 U.S. (18 Wall.) at 173. The Court reasoned that the danger of being
tried a second time is not of being found guilty a second time, but of the punishment that
would legally follow a second conviction. Id. It is this punishment "which is the real danger
guarded against by the Constitution." Id. See also Department of Revenue v. Kurth Ranch,
114 S.Ct. 1937, 1956 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (tracing the multiple punishment component of
the double jeopardy clause to Ex Parte Lange).
21. North Carolina v. Pearce, 395 U.S. 711, 717 (1969); United States v. Halper, 490
U.S. 435, 440 (1989); But see Kurth Ranch, 114 S.Ct. at 1956 (Scalia, J., dissenting) Justice
Scalia's position that the Double Jeopardy Clause does not contain a multiple punishment
component will be discussed in detail in part II.
22. Benton v. Maryland, 395 U.S. 784, 795 (1969) (holding that when a "particular
Bill of Rights guarantee is 'fundamental to the American scheme of justice,' the same
constitutional standards apply against both the state and federal governments.") Id. Benton
overruled Palko v. Connecticut, 302 U.S. 319 (1937), which held that federal double jeopardy
standards were not applicable against the states. The idea that some of the Bill of Rights are
applicable against the states is known as the "incorporation" doctrine. The central question
is whether the Fourteenth Amendment incorporates the Bill of Rights. This topic has been
the source of much constitutional debate and is well beyond the scope of this article. For
an overview, see generally Charles Fairman, Does the Fourteenth Amendment Incorporate
the Bill of Rights? 2 STAN L. REV. 5 (1949). For an overview of how the judiciary has
handled this issue see Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145 (1968), reh'g denied 392 U.S. 947
(1968).
23. See supra note 9.
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persons. ''24 In the Child Labor Tax Case25 the Court, in dicta, stated that
there is a fine line between a tax and a penalty.26
Then, in Helvering v. Mitchell27 the Court took it's closest step
towards looking at a tax statute through double jeopardy glasses. In
Mitchell, the court looked at a provision of the Revenue Act of 1928 that
required a taxpayer to pay an additional 50% of any tax deficiency that
resulted from "fraud with intent to evade."2 Though the taxpayer argued
that the proceeding to collect the 50% addition was barred by the doctrine
of double jeopardy, the Court held that the doctrine was inapplicable
because the 50% addition was not primarily a punitive sanction but rather
a remedial sanction. 29 Regardless of whether the 50% addition in Mitchell
was a tax or a sanction for fraud, it was clear that it was only a matter of
time before a tax statute would fail under double jeopardy scrutiny.
Even though the Supreme Court had not previously held a tax statute
up to double jeopardy analysis, it had addressed the constitutionality of civil
penalties, civil forfeitures, and criminal fines.30 Because the double
jeopardy clause only protects against two successive criminal proceedings
for the same offense or multiple punishments for the same offense, 3 any

24. Veazie Bank v. Fenno, 75 U.S. (8 Wall.) 533, 548 (1869).
25. 295 U.S. 20 (1922).
26. Id. at 38 ("the difference between a tax and a penalty is sometimes difficult to
define"). The court further stated:
Taxes are occasionally imposed in the discretion of the legislature on proper
subjects with the primary motive of obtaining revenue from them and with the
incidental motive of discouraging them by making their continuance onerous. They
do not lose their character as taxes because of the incidental motive. But there
comes a time in the extension of the so-called tax when it losses its character as
such and becomes a mere penalty with the characteristics of regulation and punishment.
Id.
27. 303 U.S. 391 (1938).
28. Id. at 395.
29. Id. at 398. The Court stated "[u]nless this sanction was intended as punishment,
so that the proceeding is essentially criminal, the Double Jeopardy Clause provided for the
defendant in criminal prosecutions is not applicable." Id. at 398-99. The court concluded
that the penalty was not meant to punish, but to reimburse the government for expenses
incurred as a result of investigation. Id. at 401. The majority in Kurth Ranch understood
the Court's holding in Mitchell as standing for the proposition that such a penalty could fall
under double jeopardy protection if it were intended as punishment. Department of Revenue
v. Kurth Ranch, 114 S. Ct. 1937, 1946 n.16 (1994). However, the majority also conceded
that the penalty at issue was "better characterized as a sanction for fraud than a tax ...
Id. at 1949 (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting).
30. See supra notes 4-6.
31. Mitchell, 303 U.S. at 399. The Mitchell Court stated that "Congress may impose
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double jeopardy analysis must first draw the distinction between a civil
penalty and a criminal penalty.3 2 In Ward, the Court articulated the
position that the determination of whether a penalty is civil or criminal is
one of statutory construction.33 The Court must first determine whether
Congress expressly or impliedly indicated the "preference for one label over
another. 34 If it is clear that Congress intended to establish a civil penalty,
the court must then look at whether the penalty is so punitive in purpose or
effect as to be considered criminal.3 5 Because the presumption is that the
penalty is civil in nature, 36 it must be clear that the penalty is punitive in
purpose or effect. 37 Against this backdrop, a case of particular importance
is United States v. Halper.3 s
In Halper, the Court considered the question of whether and under
what circumstances a civil penalty may be so punitive in nature as to
constitute punishment, and thus trigger the Double Jeopardy Clause.39 In
Halper, the defendant worked as a manager of a company that provided
medical services under the federal Medicare program.40 The manager was

both a criminal and a civil sanction in respect to the same act or omission." Id.
32. United States v. Ward, 448 U.S. 242, 248 (1980) (holding that a monetary penalty
imposed by the Federal Water Pollution Control Act is civil, and hence does not trigger the
Double Jeopardy Clause). For a general overview of the Ward decision, see D. Gary Beck,
Note, The Federal Water Pollution Control -Act's Self Reporting Requirement and the
PrivilegeAgainst Self-Incrimination: Civil or CriminalProceedings and Penalties? United
States v. Ward, 1981 B.Y.U. L. REV. 983.
33. Ward, 448 U.S. at 248.
34. Id.
35. Id. at 248-49. To help determine whether the penalty is criminal, the Court used
a list of several considerations that were first advanced in Kennedy v. Mendoza-Martinez,
372 U.S. 144 (1963). The factors are: Whether the sanction inivolves an affirmative disability
or restraint, whether it has historically been regarded as punishment, whether it comes into
play only on a finding of scienter, whether its operation will promote the traditional aims of
punishment-retribution and deterrence, whether the behavior to which it may rationally be
connected is assignable for it, and whether it appears excessive in relation to the alternative
purpose assigned. Id. at 168-69.
36. Department of Revenue v. Kurth Ranch, 114 S. Ct. 1937, 1954 (1994) (O'Connor,
J., dissenting).
37. Id. In Ward, the court stated, "only the clearest proof could suffice to establish
the unconstitutionality of a statute on such a ground." See also Rex Trailer Co. v. United
States, 350 U.S. 148, 154 (1955) (holding that the penalty at issue was civil in nature).
38. 490 U.S. 435 (1989).
39. Id. at 436. For a general overview of the Halper decision, see Andrew Z. Glickman, Note, Civil Sanctions and the Double Jeopardy Clause:Applying the Multiple Punishment
Doctrine to ParallelProceedingsAfter United States v. Halper, 76 VA. L. REV. 1251 (1990).
40. Halper, 490 U.S. at 437.
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indicted for submitting sixty-five false claims for reimbursement. 4' The
manager was eventually convicted on all sixty-five counts and sentenced to
imprisonment for two years and fined $5,000.42 The government then
brought action under the Civil False Claims Act4 3 seeking a penalty of
$2,000 per violation." The district court concluded that the authorized
recovery of $130,000 bore no "rational relation" to the government's actual
loss plus cost associated with the government's investigation. 45 Because
the authorized penalty was 220 times greater than the government's
measurable loss, the penalty was so excessive that it qualified as punishment
and was thus barred by the Double Jeopardy Clause.46
The Supreme Court started its Halperanalysis by restating the principle
that punishment may arise from either criminal or civil proceedings.4 7 The
Court looked at prior case law and determined that although the government
through civil penalties is entitled to "rough remedial justice', 48 Halper was
distinguishable from cases relied upon by the government because the
penalty was so overwhelmingly disproportionate to the damages caused.49
The Court agreed that even though a civil penalty may advance punitive and

41. Id. The manager sought a reimbursement of $12.00 per claim when the actual
service rendered entitled hiscompany to only $3.00 per claim. Thus his company was
overpaid by a total of $585.00.
42. Id.
43. 31 U.S.C. § 3729 (1982).
44. Halper, 490 U.S. at 438.
45. Id. at 439. The government's actual loss was $585.00.
46. Id. at 439-40.
47. Id. at 443.
48. Id. at 446. The Court stated that the Government "may demand compensation
according to imprecise formulas, such as reasonable liquidated damages or a fixed sum plus
double damages, without being deemed to have imposed a second punishment, for the
purpose of double jeopardy analysis." Id.
49. Id. at 449. The government's argument was that per three of its prior decisions,
(Helvering v. Mitchell, 303 U.S. 391 (1938); United States ex rel. Marcus v. Hess, 317 U.S.
537 (1943); Rex Trailer Co. v. United States, 350 U.S. 148 (1955)), the Court had foreclosed
the possibility that a civil proceeding may give rise to a double jeopardy violation. Id. at
441. The Court stated that Mitchell was distinguishable because it did not address the
question of whether a sanction, in application, "may be so divorced from any remedial goal
that it constitutes 'punishment' ... .. .. Id. at 443. Likewise, Hess was distinguishable
because even though the government's recovery was greater than the actual damages, it "did
not do more than afford the government complete indemnity for the injuries done it." Id at
444-45. Finally, in Rex Trailer, the Court held that even though the government's loss was
difficult, if not impossible, to ascertain, the defendant had not been subjected to a "measure
of recovery ... so unreasonable or excessive" as to violate the Double Jeopardy Clause. Id.
at 446.
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remedial goals, ° a civil or criminal penalty that advances only punitive
goals constitutes punishment.5' The civil penalty is barred when it follows
a criminal penalty and "may not be characterized as remedial, but as serving
the goals of deterrence or retribution. 5 2 Thus, the Halpercase established
that when the civil penalty appears to bear no "rational relation" to the goal
of compensating the government for its loss, it takes on the characteristics
of punishment because it serves only the goals of retribution or deterrence.
Therefore the defendant is entitled to an accounting of the government's
damages and costs to determine whether the second proceeding is criminal
in nature, and as such, violates the Double Jeopardy Clause.53
The Court's decision in Halper was unanimous.5 4 Although the Court
had extended the "no-double-punishment rule to civil penalties, 5 5 it did not
appear to provide the lower courts with a workable framework for applying
it. Realizing that it may have opened a pandora's box, the Court sought to
limit the scope of its holding. The Court stated that Halper was the "rule
for the rare case 5 6 that is not "far reaching or disruptive of the government's need to combat fraud."57 Justice Kennedy wrote a concurring
opinion to stress the limitation of the holding. 8 Although the Court
stressed that the "rational relation" test is the rule for the rare case,59 it
must not have seen Kurth Ranch looming on the horizon.
II. DEPARTMENT OF REVENUE V. KURTH RANCH
A. FACTS

On October 18, 1987, officers from the Choteau County Sheriffs
Office and the United States Drug Enforcement Administration raided the

50. Halper, 490 U.S. at 447.
51. Id. at 448.
52. Id. at 448-49.
53. Id. at 448-50. The Court then remanded the case so that the government could
have an opportunity to demonstrate that the district court's assessment of its injuries was
erroneous. Id. at 452.
54. Id. at 436.
55. Department of Revenue v. Kurth Ranch, 114 S. Ct. 1937, 1957 (1994) (Scalia, J.,
dissenting).
56. Halper, 490 U.S. at 449.
57. Id.
58. Id. at 452. Justice Kennedy said the opinion "does not authorize courts to
undertake a broad inquiry into the subjective purposes that may be thought to lie behind a
given judicial proceeding." Id. at 453.

59. Id. at 449.
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Kurth Ranch? ° The law enforcement officers arrested the Kurths and
Halleys, 6' and seized large amounts of marijuana and marijuana derivatives
as well as related paraphernalia. 62 The drug raid gave rise to four separate
legal proceedings.6 3
First, criminal charges were filed on October 23, 1987. 64 Richard
Kurth was charged with criminal sale of dangerous drugs (marijuana),
criminal possession of a dangerous drug (marijuana), solicitation to commit
the offense of criminal possession of a dangerous drug with intent to sell
(marijuana), and criminal possession of a dangerous drug (hashish). 6' The
other five defendants were each charged with conspiracy to possess drugs
with intent to sell, or, in the alternative, possession of drugs with intent to
sell.6 The defendants pled guilty on March 25, 1988 and were sentenced
on July 18, 1988.67 The second proceeding was initiated when the county
60. Drummond v. Department of Revenue (In re Kurth Ranch), 145 B.R. 61, 66
(Bankr. D. Mont. 1990).
61. Id. Arrested were Richard M. Kurth, Judith M. Kurth, Douglas Kurth, Rhonda
Kurth, Clay Halley and Cindy Halley. The Kurths first started growing marijuana in 19851986 in an attempt to save their family farm from creditors. Id. at 63. At the time of their
arrest, the business had "expanded to the largest marijuana growing operation in the state of
Montana ....
Id. at 66.
62. Id. Among the items confiscated were: 1) 2155 marijuana plants in various stages
of growth; 2) 7 gallons of hash oil; 3) 4 bags of marijuana at two pounds each; 4) 65 one
gram vials of hash tar; 5) 14 baby food size jars of hash tar; 7) 1 bag of marijuana, 1/4
pound; 8) 5 plastic bags of marijuana, total 2230 grams; and 9) approximately 100 pounds
of marijuana stems, leaves, parts, etc. Item #9 is commonly referred to as "shake". "Shake"
is the portion of the marijuana plant that has less street value because it contains lower
tetrahydrocannabinol (T.H.C.), the chemical substance in the marijuana bud which activates
the user's senses. Id. The extended Kurth family, in an effort to maximize its profits, began
to boil the "shake" in alcohol in order to manufacture marijuana oil or "hash oil." Id.
63. Department of Revenue v. Kurth Ranch, 114 S. Ct. 1937, 1942 (1994).
64. Brief of Petitioner at 5, Department of Revenue v. Kurth Ranch, 114 S. Ct. 1937
(1994) (No. 93-144).
65. Kurth Ranch, 114 S. Ct. at 1942.
66. Id.
67. Brief of Petitioner at 6, Department of Revenue V. Kurth Ranch, 114 S. Ct. 1937
(1994) (No. 93-144). The defendants pled guilty to and were sentenced as follows. Richard
M. Kurth: Count I - criminal sale of dangerous drugs, marijuana, in violation of MONT.
CODE ANN. § 45-9-101 (1987)--20 years in prison with the last 15 suspended; Count II criminal possession of a dangerous drug, marijuana, with intent to sell, in violation of MONT.
CODE ANN. § 45-9-103 (1987)--20 years in prison with last 15 suspended; Count III solicitation to commit the offense of criminal possession of a dangerous drug, marijuana,
with intent to sell, in violation of MONT. CODE ANN. § 45-4-101 (1987)--20 years in prison
with the last 15 suspended; Count IV - criminal possession of a dangerous drug, hashish, in
violation of MONT. CODE ANN. §45-9-102 (1987)--5 years in prison. Kurth Ranch, 145 B.R.
at 64. Judith M. Kurth: conspiracy to commit the offense of criminal possession of a
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attorney filed a civil forfeiture action seeking recovery of cash and
equipment used on the farm in conjunction with the marijuana operation. 8
The third proceeding began on December 8, 1987 when the Department
of Revenue of Montana, pursuant to the Montana Dangerous Drug Tax
Act, 69 assessed a tax against the defendants in the amount of $894,940.9970 The Montana Dangerous Drug Tax Act was passed on October 1, 1987,
only seventeen days before the raid on the Kurth ranch.7' Consequently,
this is the first time that the Drug Tax Act was used. The Drug Tax Act is
a tax "on the possession and storage of dangerous drugs. 7 2 The tax is either
ten percent of the assessed market value of the drug or $100 per ounce of

dangerous drug marijuana, with intent to sell, in violation of MONT. CODE ANN. § 45-4-102-5 years in prison with the last 4 suspended. Id. Douglas Kurth: conspiracy to commit the
offense of criminal possession of a dangerous drug, marijuana, with intent to sell, in violation
of MONT CODE ANN § 45-4-102 (1987)--20 years in prison with all 20 suspended. Id.
Rhonda Kurth and Cindy Halley: conspiracy to commit the offense of criminal possession
of a dangerous drug, marijuana, with intent to sell, in violation of MONT. CODE ANN. § 45-4102 (1987)--3 years suspended sentence. Id. at 64-65. Clay Halley: conspiracy to commit
the offense of criminal possession of a dangerous drug, marijuana, with intent to sell, in
violation of MONT. CODE ANN. § 45-4-102 (1987)--10 years in prison with all 10 suspended.
Id. at 64.
68. Kurth Ranch, 114 S. Ct. at 1942. This action was settled with an agreement to
forfeit $18,016.83 in cash and equipment. Id. The forfeiture proceeding was initiated on
October 23, 1987 and resolved on March 25, 1988. Brief of Petitioner at 5-6, Department
of Revenue v. Kurth Ranch, 114 S.Ct. 1937 (1994) (No. 93-144).
69. Id. at 1942 n.10. See also MONT. CODE ANN. § 15-25-101 to 15-25-123 (1987).
70. Kurth Ranch, 114 S. Ct. at 1942. This amount included a tax "on marijuana
plants, harvested marijuana, hash tar, hash oil, interest and penalties." Id. Note, the opinions
of the Bankruptcy Court and the Supreme Court differ in the amount of the assessed tax by
$30,000. The Supreme Court noticed the discrepancy and attributed it to the Bankruptcy
Court's failure to. "take account of $30,000 collected before computation of the final
assessment." Id. at 1942 n.10. This author will use the figure supplied by the Supreme
Court. After all, in the words of Justice Jackson, "We [the Supreme Court] are not final
because we are infallible, but we are infallible only because we are final." Brown v. Allen,
344 U.S. 443, 540 (1953) (Jackson, J., concurring).
71. Drummond v. Department of Revenue (In re Kurth Ranch), 145 B.R. 61, 66
(Bankr. D. Mont. 1990).
72. MONT. CODE ANN. § 15-25-111 (1) (1987). This section provides:
(1) There is a tax on the possession and storage of dangerous drugs. Except as
provided in 15-25-112, each person possessing or storing dangerous drugs is liable
for the tax. The tax imposed is determined pursuant to subsection (2). The tax is
due and payable on the date of assessment. The department shall add an
administration fee of 5% of the tax imposed pursuant to subsection (2) to offset
costs incurred in assessing value, in collecting the tax, and in any review and
appeal process.
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marijuana.7 3 The arresting officer, pursuant to the Drug Tax Act, was
required to fill out an itemized form of the items seized.74 The Montana
Department of Revenue then computed the defendants tax liability.7 5 The
Kurths contested the validity of the assessments in administrative proceedings:76 However, on September 9, 1988, the proceedings were stayed when
the Kurths initiated the fourth legal proceeding by filing for bankruptcy."
The trustee and debtors then filed a complaint to contest the tax
assessment.78 The Department of Revenue filed an answer, and discovery
was held.79 The case then proceeded to trial on March 17 and 18, 1990.80
B. CASE HISTORY

The Bankruptcy Court began its opinion by analyzing the process by
which the Miscellaneous Tax Division of the Montana Department of
Revenue ascertained the tax amortization of each item.8' The Bankruptcy
Court held that all but $181,000 of the assessment was invalid.82 With the

73. MONT.

Id.

CODE ANN. § 15-25-111 (2) (1987) (amended 1989). Section (2) states:
(2) With the exception that the tax on possession and storage of less than
1 ounce, 1 gram, or 100 micrograms of dangerous drugs must be that set
forth below for 1 ounce, 1 gram, or 100 micrograms, the tax on possession
and storage of dangerous drugs is the greater of:
(a) 10% of the assessed market value of the drugs, as determined by the
department; or
(b) (i) $100 per ounce of marijuana, as defined in 50-32-101, or its
derivatives, as determined by the aggregate weight of the substance seized;
(ii) $250 per ounce of hashish, as defined in 50-32-101, as determined by the aggregate weight of the substance seized;

74. Drummond, 145 B.R. at 66.
75. Id. at 67.
76. Department of Revenue v. Kurth Ranch, 114 S. Ct. 1937, 1943 (1994).
77. Id.
78. Drummond, 145 B.R. at 62.
79. Id. at 63.
80. Id.
81. Id. at 67. Per the Montana Drug Tax Statute, the tax due is 10% of the assessed
market value or $100 per ounce of marijuana. MONT. CODE ANN. §15-25-111 (2) (1987)
(amended 1989). Because the 2155 plants were not yet in "packaged form", the Bankruptcy
Court was forced to analyze how the Department of Revenue obtained its data.
82. Department of Revenue v. Kurth Ranch, 114 S. Ct. 1937, 1943 (1994). The
Bankruptcy Court determined that the process used by the Department of Revenue to
calculate the tax on items 1, 2, 4, 5 and 6 (the marijuana plants, and various jars and bottles
of "hash oil" and "hash tar") was "arbitrary in that it lacked any basis in fact." Drummond,
145 B.R. at 69. For example, the value set for the marijuana plants was $1800 per plant,
depreciated based on the plants stage of growth. The Department of Revenue official took
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formalities out of the way, the Bankruptcy Court was able to address the
Kurth family's argument that the tax violated the Double Jeopardy
83
Clause.
The Bankruptcy Court determined that Halper was controlling and
analyzed the case from that perspective. 4 The State first argued that the
tax was not punishment because it was designed to cover law enforcement
cost. 5 The Bankruptcy Court noted that the Montana Department of
Revenue failed to provide "one scintilla of evidence" as to the government's
costs. 8 6 The State further argued that in United States v. Sanchez, 7 a tax
of $100 per ounce was held valid when the Court noted that a tax does not
cease to be valid merely because it "regulates, discourages or even definitely
deters the activities taxed., 88 The Bankruptcy Court ruled that because
Sanchez did not involve a multiple-punishment inquiry it was not applicable. 9 Furthermore, the tax imposed on the "shake" was eight times the
market value of the product.90 The Bankruptcy Court viewed this disparity
as further proof of the tax's penal nature. 9' The Bankruptcy Court
concluded that the Drug Tax Act had "deterrence and punishment as its
purpose" and thus constituted a second punishment in violation of the
Double Jeopardy Clause. 9 2 The district court affirmed the decision in an

the 2155 plants and divided the lot by a figure of 10. Id. at 68. Thus, the plants ranged in

value from $1800 per plant down to $180 per plant. Id. A Drug Enforcement Agency
official that testified said, a $1500 per plant figure is based on a 12 foot plant producing 2
pounds of "bud". Id. at 69. Yet, none of the plants seized was over 2 to 3 feet in height and
no weight of bud was taken from any plant. Id. at 69. The court did allow the tax to stand
on items 3, 7, 8 and 9 the packaged marijuana. Item 3 was 128 ounces, 7 was 4 ounces, 8
was 79 ounces and the shake was 1600 ounces for a total of 1811 ounces at $100 per ounce
or $181,000. Id. at 72.
83. Drummond, 145 B.R. at 73.
84. Kurth Ranch, 114 S. Ct. at 1943.
85. Id.

86. Id.
87. 340 U.S. 42 (1950).

88. Drummond v. Department of Revenue (In re Kurth Ranch), 145 B.R. 61, 75
(Bankr. D. Mont. 1990) (citing Sanchez, 340 U.S. at 44).
89. Id.
90. Id. The deputy sheriff's report valued the shake at $200 per pound. Id. at 72.
The tax, at $100 per ounce, would be $1,600 or eight times it's actual value.
91. Id.
92. Id. at 76. The Court applied the test from Kennedy v. Mendoza-Martinez, and
determined the following:
The punitive nature of the tax is evident here because drug tax laws have
historically been regarded as penal in nature, the Montana Act promotes the
traditional aims of punishment--retribution and deterrence, the tax applies to
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unpublished opinion. 93 The Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit also
affirmed.94
The court of appeals agreed that Halperwas controlling and
that the central inquiry was whether the sanction imposed bore a rational
relation to the damages suffered by the government. 9 Although the State
argued that prior case law held that a marijuana tax is non-punitive, 96 the
court of appeals distinguished the State's cited cases claiming that they were
inapplicable because they did not involve a previous criminal conviction.97
The court of appeals then concluded that because the State refused to offer
any evidence justifying its imposition of the tax, the tax was unconstitutional
as applied to the Kurths. 98
While Kurth Ranch was pending appeal to the United States Supreme
Court, the Montana Supreme Court upheld the Drug Tax Act in Sorensen
v. Department of Revenue. 99 The Montana Supreme Court determined that
the Montana legislature intended to establish a civil penalty and that the tax
had a remedial purpose.'0° The United States Supreme Court granted
certiorari. 01

C. THE SUPREME COURT DECISION

Writing for the majority, Justice Stevens began by defining the issue
as whether a tax on the possession of illegal drugs, assessed after the State
has imposed a criminal penalty for the same conduct, violated the successive
behavior which is already a crime, the tax allows for sanctions by restraint of
Debtors property, the tax requires a finding of illegal possession of dangerous drugs
and therefore a finding of scienter, the tax will promote elimination of illegal drug
possession, and the tax appears excessive in relation to the alternate purpose
assigned, especially in the absence of any record develops by the state as to
societal costs.
Id. at 75-76.
93. Drummond v. Department of Revenue, No. CV-90-084-PGH, 1991 WL 365065
(D. Mont., Apr. 23, 1991).
94. In re Kurth Ranch, 986 F.2d 1308, 1309 (9th Cir. 1993), cerl. granted, 114 S. Ct.
38 (1993).
95. Kurth Ranch 986 F.2d at 1311.
96. Id. The state relied on Minor v. United States, 396 U.S. 87 (1969), United States
v. Sanchez, 340 U.S. 42 (1950), and Simmons v. United States, 476 F.2d 715 (10th Cir.
1973).
97. In re Kurth Ranch, 986 F.2d at 1311.
98. Id. at 1312.
99. 836 P.2d 29 (MoNT. 1992).
100. Id. at 31. Furthermore, the Montana Supreme Court found Halper was not
controlling because it was limited to "the rare case" and involved a civil penalty rather than
a tax. Id. at 32-33.
101. Department of Revenue v. Kurth Ranch, 114 S. Ct. 38 (1993).
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punishment provision of the Double Jeopardy Clause. 0 2 The majority
characterized the issue in Halperas "whether and under what circumstances
a civil penalty may constitute 'punishment' for the purpose of double
jeopardy analysis."' 3 The Court then stated that the answer to the Halper
question does not decide the "different" Kurth Ranch question.' 4 The
Court distinguished Halperfrom Kurth Ranch because Halperdealt with the
05
characterization of a civil penalty, while Kurth Ranch dealt with a tax.'
Furthermore, because the purpose behind a civil penalty is different than the
purpose behind a tax,' °6 the "rational relation" test of determining whether
the amount of the penalty is proportionate to the government's damage and
cost, was ill suited for tax statutes107
Nevertheless, the Court did determine that there were two important
lessons to be learned from Halper that were applicable to its analysis in
Kurth Ranch. First, whether the legislature describes a statute as civil or
criminal is not of "paramount importance."' 0' 8 The label simply does not
foreclose the possibility that a characterization as X means that it is not Y.
Second, and perhaps less apparent, Halper stood for the proposition that a
civil sanction could rise to the level of a punishment and thus violate the
Double Jeopardy Clause.1 9 Thus, Halper opened the double jeopardy
door wide enough so that a tax statute could be pulled into the room of
double jeopardy protection. With Halper out of the way, the Court could
now proceed to examine the constitutionality of the Montana Drug Tax
Statute.
The majority began by recognizing the general rule that the unlawfulness of an activity does not prevent its taxation." 0 The Court said that if
the state had not previously punished the Kurths for the same offense, or if

102. Department of Revenue v. Kurth Ranch, 114 S. Ct. 1937, 1941 (1994).
103. Id. at 1944 (citing United States v. Halper, 490 U.S. 435, 435 (1989)).
104. Id.

105. Id.
106. Chief Justice Rehnquist, though disagreeing with the decision reached in Kurth
Ranch, agreed that the Halper test should not apply. Id. at 1949 (Rehnquist, C.J.,
dissenting). The Chief Justice stated: "the purpose behind a tax statute is not to recover the
cost incurred by the government for bringing someone to book for violation of law, (referring
to civil penalty), but is instead to either raise revenue, deter conduct, or both." Id.
107. Id. at 1948.

108. Id. at 1945 (citing United States v. Halper, 490 U.S. 435, 447 (1989)).
109. Id. at 1946 (citing Halper, 490 U.S. at 447 stating that: "only the character of

actual sanctions can substantiate a possible double jeopardy violation."). It is important to
note that Halper was the first time that the Supreme Court extended the "non doublepunishment" rule to civil penalties. Id at 1957 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
110. Id. at 1945 (citing Marchetti v. United States, 390 U.S. 39, 44 (1968)).
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447

the state had assessed the tax in the same proceeding that resulted in his
conviction, there would not have been an issue."' The Court focused on
prior cases that held that a tax may violate the Double Jeopardy Clause" 2
and reasoned that its prior holdings, combined with the Halper holding that
"labels do not control," indicated that a tax statute could come under double
jeopardy scrutiny."'
The Court stated that although neither a high tax rate nor a deterrent
purpose "automatically" made the tax a form of punishment, these factors
were at least consistent with a punitive character."14 The Court noted that
the "shake" was taxed at a rate that was "remarkably high" compared to its
market value.' 1 5 In addition, the majority stated that the preamble to the
Drug Tax Act indicated the legislature's intent to deter people from
possessing marijuana." 6 The majority dismissed the State's argument that
many valid taxes such as those on cigarettes and alcohol are high and

111. Id.
112. Id. at 1945-46. The Court referred to Helvering v. Mitchell, 303 U.S. 391 (1938)
(holding such a penalty could trigger double penalty protection if it were intended as
punishment); A. Magnano Co. v. Hamilton, 292 U.S. 40 (1934) (cautioning against
invalidating a tax simply because its enforcement might be oppressive). But "there comes
a time ... [when] the so-called tax . . . loses its character as such and becomes a mere
penalty with the characteristics of retribution and punishment." Id. at 1946 (citing Child
Labor Tax Case, 259 U.S. 20 (1922)).
113. Kurth Ranch, 114 S. Ct. at 1946.
114. Id.
115. Id.
116. Kurth Ranch, 114 S. Ct. at 1946 n.18. The preamble provides:
"WHEREAS, dangerous drugs are commodities having considerable value, and the
existence in Montana of a large and profitable dangerous drug industry and
expensive trade in dangerous drugs is irrefutable; and
WHEREAS, the state does not endorse the manufacturing of or trading in
dangerous drugs and does not consider the'use of such drugs to be acceptable, but
it recognizes the economic impact upon the state of the manufacturing and selling
of dangerous drugs; and
WHEREAS, it is appropriate that some of the revenue generated by this tax be
devoted to continuing investigative efforts directed toward the identification, arrest,
and prosecution of individuals involved in conducting illegal continuing criminal
enterprises that affect the distribution of dangerous drugs in Montana.
THEREFORE, the Legislature of the State of Montana does not wish to give
credence to the notion that the manufacturing, selling, and use of dangerous drugs
is legal or otherwise proper, but finds it appropriate in view of the economic
impact of such drugs to tax those who profit from drug-related offenses and to
dispose of the tax proceeds through providing additional anti-crime initiatives
without burdening law abiding taxpayers."
1987 Mont. Laws Ch. 563 (preamble) (1987).
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motivated by an interest in deterrence." 7 The majority reasoned that
although these factors were consistent
with a punitive nature, they were not
8
dispositive to the case at bar."
Instead, the majority pointed to the "other unusual features," which
when combined with the high tax rate and deterrent features of the Drug
Tax Act, make the Act unconstitutional. 19 First, the Court stated that it
was significant that the tax only applied to those people who had committed
a crime. 20 The Court then pointed to Sanchez as standing for the proposition that when there has been no commission of a crime, the tax is better
classified as a civil rather than a criminal action.12 ' The Court noted that
the Drug Tax Act not only required the commission of a crime, but the tax
could only be assessed after the taxpayer had been arrested. 2 2 The second
unusual feature of the Drug Tax Act was that while it was a "tax on the
possession and storage of dangerous drugs,"' 121 the tax was imposed on
goods that the state had already confiscated. 24 The Court stated that a tax
on goods that neither exist (the state destroyed them) nor were ever lawfully
possessed, is punitive in character.25
The majority concluded that based on all of the above mentioned
factors, the tax constituted punishment and consequently was barred by the
Double Jeopardy Clause. 26 The majority also took one last step, stating
117. Id. at 1946-47. The majority conceded that it upheld a $100 per ounce federal tax
on marijuana in United States v. Sanchez, 340 U.S. 42 (1950) (note this was $100 per ounce
in 1950) however, Sanchez did not deal with the double jeopardy issue. Id. at 1946.
118. Id. at 1946-47.
119. Id. at 1947-48.
120. Id. at 1947. "That condition is 'significant of penal and prohibitory intent rather
than the gathering of revenue'." (quoting United States v. Constantine, 296 U.S. 287, 295
(1935)).
121. Id. at 1947 n.20 (citing Sanchez, 340 U.S. at 45).
122. Id. The majority said that taxes on illegal activities are different than taxes with
a revenue raising purpose. Id. Taxes on illegal activities are also different from mixed
motive taxes such as those on cigarettes. Id. When the government taxes cigarettes, it not
only wants to discourage smoking, but also realizes that the product's benefits, such as
creating employment and tax revenues, outweigh the harm. Id. The Court then made a
curious statement: "These justifications vanish when the taxed activity is completely
forbidden, for the legitimate revenue-raising purpose that might support such a tax could be
equally well served by increasing the fine imposed upon conviction." Id. See infra notes
223-31 and accompanying text for an explanation of what the Court may have meant.
123. MONT. CODE ANN. § 15-25-111 (1) (1987).
124. Kurth Ranch, 114 S. Ct. at 1948.
125. Id.
126. Id. "This tax imposed on criminals and no others, departs so far from normal
revenue laws as to become a form of punishment .... Taken as a whole, this drug tax is
a concoction of anomalies, too far removed in crucial respects from a standard tax assessment
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that even if the Halper test was applied, the state had failed to show a
"rational relation" between its assessment and the cost and damages caused
127
by the Kurths.
Chief Justice Rehnquist wrote a dissenting opinion in which he agreed
with the majority's rejection of the Halper analysis. 28 Chief Justice
Rehnquist then focused on the two "other unusual features" advanced by the
majority. Disagreeing with the majority's first contention that the Drug Tax
was conditioned on the commission of a crime, Chief Justice Rehnquist
stated that the statute "merely acknowledges" the problems faced in taxing
an illegal activity. 2 9 He noted that although the majority was paying lip
service to the general rule that taxation of an illegal activity was permissible,130 the assertion that the justifications for mixed motive taxes vanish
when the taxed activity is illegal was really contrary to the Court's prior
holdings in Marchetti and Constantine.'3' As to the majority's second
contention that the tax was punitive in nature because it was levied on goods
that the taxpayer did not possess at the time of taxation, Chief Justice
32
Rehnquist claimed that the Court was exalting form over substance.
The Chief Justice made three additional points. First, even though the
Dangerous Drug Tax is described as a tax on storage and possession, by
looking at the preamble it is evident that the Drug Tax Act was intended to
raise revenue from the "profitable underground drug business."'' 33 Second,
though the majority discussed the disparity between the value of the "shake"
and the tax assessed against it, the majority glossed over the reality that the
tax on the higher quality "bud" was only eighty percent of the product's
market value.'3 Third, when the tax is compared to other "sin" taxes, it
35
is not so disproportionate as to be considered arbitrary or shocking.

Id......
127. Id. The Court noted that Montana had not claimed that its assessment of the tax
"even remotely approximates the cost of investigating, apprehending and prosecuting the

Kurths or that it roughly relates to any actual damages that they caused the state." Id. at
1948.
128. Id. at 1949. For Chief Justice Rehnquist, the purpose of a tax statute was just too
different from the purpose of a civil penalty to allow the Halper test to be applied.
129. Id.
130. See supra note 110 and accompanying text.
131. Kurth Ranch, 114 S. Ct. at 1950-51.
132. Id. "Surely the court is not suggesting that the state must permit the Kurths to
keep the contraband in order to tax its possession." Id.
133. Id. at 1951.
134. Id. at 1952.
135. Id.
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Thus, the tax was not so punitive in nature as to be considered a form of
punishment.
Justice O'Connor wrote a dissenting opinion, in which she disagreed
with the majority's failure to apply the Halper analysis. 3 6 Justice O'Connor also viewed the majority opinion as barring the imposition of the drug

tax altogether.' 37

Justice Scalia, joined by Justice Thomas, wrote a dissenting opinion in
which he advanced the theory that the Double Jeopardy Clause does not
prohibit multiple punishments but only multiple prosecutions. 3 ' Justice
Scalia presented a historical analysis to demonstrate how the Court has
historically viewed the multiple punishment component of the Double
Jeopardy Clause incorrectly.13 9 According to Justice Scalia this was never
a problem until Halper extended the no-double punishment rule to civil
penalties while concurrently limiting judicial deference as it related to
legislative intent. " ° Justice Scalia then applied the Kennedy-Ward test to
the Drug Tax Act and concluded that application of the Act did not
constitute a second criminal proceeding.' 4' In addition he concluded that,
because the Montana legislature authorized the taxes, the taxes did not
violate the Double Jeopardy Clause. 42

136. Id. at 1954 (O'Connor, J., dissenting). Justice O'Connor argued that the Court
would have examined the statute under Halper had it provided for a $100 per ounce fine.
Id. at 1953. Justice O'Connor saw "no constitutional distinction between such a fine and the
tax at issue in the case." Id. at 1953. In addition, Justice O'Connor asserted that the lower
courts applied Halper incorrectly. Id. at 1954. Justice O'Connor views Halper as a two part
test requiring the defendant to "first show the absence of a rational relationship between the
amount of the sanction and the government's non punitive objectives, and then for the
Government to provide an accounting." Id. Finally, Justice O'Connor stated that the Court's
decision was unnecessary because the excessive fines clause is available to preserve
individual liberty from "governmental overreaching." Id. at 1955.
137. Id. at 1955. Justice O'Connor noted:
[T]he Court holds that the imposition of the drug tax is always punitive regardless
of the nature of the 9ffense or the offender. The consequences of this decision are
astounding .... The state of Montana, along with about half of the other states,
is now precluded from ever imposing the drug tax on a person who has been
punished for a possessory offense.
id.
138. Id. at 1955 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
139. Id. at 1955-59. Justice Scalia traced the history of the multiple punishment
component of the Double Jeopardy Clause from its inception in Ex Parte Lange, 85 U.S. (18
Wall.) 163 (1873) through United States v. Halper, 490 U.S. 435 (1989).
140. Kurth Ranch, 114 S. Ct. at 1957.
141. Id. at 1960.
142. Id.
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III. ANALYSIS
A. THE SUPREME COURT DECIDED NOT TO APPLY HALPER

Although Kurth Ranch was decided by a slim 5-4 majority, the Court
overwhelmingly agreed that Halper was neither controlling nor applicable.1 43 The Court's decision to distinguish Kurth Ranch from Halper was
correct for the following reasons: 1) a tax statute and civil penalty are
motivated by and serve very different purposes; 2) Halperinvolved a fixed
penalty and Kurth Ranch did not; 3) the Kurth family was not the "small
gauge offender" contemplated in Halper; and 4) the Kurth family never
"activated" the Halpertest by first demonstrating that the tax was disproportionate to the damages caused.
First, a tax and a civil penalty serve very different goals. Taxation is
a way of apportioning the cost of government.'" When a sovereign
imposes a tax, it seeks to generate revenue. When an individual or entity
is taxed, it is not necessary that the amount of the tax bear any rational
relation to the cost incurred on the part of the government by that individual. 45 It is also widely accepted that "mixed-motive" taxes may be
imposed to raise revenue and deter a disfavored activity. 146 By contrast,
civil penalties serve a compensatory purpose. 41 Civil penalties are
imposed to assist the sovereign in recouping the expenditure associated with
the individual's or entity's activity. 48 As with taxes, it is also widely
accepted that civil penalties may serve a dual purpose, to compensate the
sovereign and to deter a disfavored activity. 49
In Halper,the court held that because the civil penalty bore no rational
relation to the government's loss, the civil penalty had lost its distinction as

143. Eight of the nine Justices, including the Chief Justice, agreed that Halper did not

apply. The lone dissenting voice on this issue was Justice O'Connor. See supra notes 13637 and accompanying text.
144. Welch v. Henry, 305 U.S. 134, 146 (1938).

145. Commonwealth Edison Co. v. Montana, 435 U.S. 609, 622-23 (1981) (citing
Carmichael v. Southern Coal & Coke Co., 301 U.S. 495, 521-23 (1937)).
146. Kurth Ranch, 114 S. Ct. at 1947. The most common examples of "mixed-motive"
taxes are those on tobacco and alcohol. See supra note 122 for a brief explanation of the
rationale behind the imposition of mixed-motive taxes.
147. Cf. Marcus v. Hess, 317 U.S. 537, 549 (1943).
148. Helvering v. Mitchell, 303 U.S. 391, 401 (1938). In Helvering, the Court noted
"[tihey [tax related sanctions] are provided primarily as a safeguard for the protection of the
revenue and to reimburse the Government for the heavy expense of investigation and the loss
resulting from the taxpayer's fraud." Id.
149. United States v. Halper, 490 U.S. 435, 447 (1989).
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civil and became criminal."s The sovereign was then required to provide
an accounting in order to rebut the presumption."'5 A tax, on the other
hand, does not require that the cost to the government by the individual's
activities bear a rational relation to the amount of taxes assessed against the
individual. 5 2 As a result, the lower courts' application of the Halper test
to the tax statute at issue in Kurth Ranch was erroneous.
Second, the fixed penalty examined in Halper is distinguishable from
the excise tax at issue in Kurth Ranch. The statute at issue in Halper
provided for a civil penalty of $2,000 per violation. 5 3 In Halper, the
individual that perpetrated the fraud committed 65 separate violations at
$9.00 each for a total "windfall" of $585."' 4 The perpetrator was fined
$130,000 for his violations.' 55 Had the individual committed 65 violations
at $9,900 each for a total of $643,500, he would have still been fined
$130,000. Thus, the civil penalty at issue in Halper did not contain any
element of rough proportionality. In contrast, the Drug Tax Act at issue in
Kurth Ranch is an excise tax. 56 The Drug Tax Act allows a tax on
marijuana that is 10% of the market value or $100 per ounce, whichever is
greater. 15' As such, the amount of the tax assessment is proportionate to
the amount of contraband held by the taxpayer. Therefore, the fixed penalty
at issue in Halper is distinguishable from the excise tax in Kurth Ranch.
Third, the extended Kurth family was not the "small gauge offender"
contemplated in Halper. In Halper, the fraud perpetrator was prolific but
insignificant, netting a profit of $585 over the period of one year.158 By
contrast, the Kurth family had the largest marijuana growing operation in the
state of Montana' 59 and generated revenues of between nine to eighteen
thousand dollars every seven to ten days.160

150. Id. at 449.

151. Id.

152. Commonwealth Edison Co. v. Montana, 453 U.S. 609, 622 (1981).
153. Halper, 490 U.S. at 438.
154. Id. at 439.
155. Id.
156. MONT. CODE ANN. § 15-25-111 (2) (.1987) (amended 1989).
157. Id.
158. Halper, 490 U.S. at 439.
159. Drummond v. Department of Revenue, 145 B.R. 61, 66 (Bankr. D. Mont. 1990).
The Kurth family harvested and sold five to ten pounds of "the best marijuana in Montana"
every seven to ten days. Brief for Petitioner n.3, Department of Revenue v. Kurth Ranch,
114 S. Ct. 1937 (1944) (No. 93-144). When arrested the Kurth family was grossing $1,800
per pound of "bud." Id.
160. Kurth Ranch, 114 S. Ct. at 1937.
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Finally, even if the Halper test was applicable to the facts of Kurth
Ranch, as the lower courts concluded the Halper test was never properly
"activated."'' The Halper test is a two part inquiry.' 62 First, the defendant must sustain a criminal penalty followed by a civil penalty in a
subsequent proceeding. 63 The defendant must "activate" the test by
showing that the civil penalty in the subsequent proceeding bears "no
,, 64
rational relation to . . . compensating the government for its loss ....
Second, the government must then step forward and provide an accounting. 65 The lower courts never required the Kurth family to demonstrate
the lack of a rational relation between their penalty and the amount of the
government's loss.166 Instead, the government was required to provide an
accounting prior to satisfaction of the first part of the test. Therefore,
because Kurth Ranch is clearly distinguishable from Halper, the Court was
correct in not applying the Halper test to this case.
B. THE MAJORITY INCORRECTLY STRUCK DOWN THE DRUG TAX ACT AS
APPLIED

After the Court rejected the Halpermode of analysis, the Court looked
at a number of factors to determine whether the Drug Tax Act violated the
Double Jeopardy Clause ban on successive punishments for the same
offense. The Court determined that the tax: 1) allowed for sanctions by
restraint of the Kurth's property; 2) had been assessed only after the
taxpayer had been arrested; 3) promoted the traditional aims of punishment;
4) was conditioned on the commission of a crime; 5) would deter people
from possessing marijuana; and 6) appeared excessive in relation to the
government's cost of investigating, apprehending and prosecuting the
Kurths. 67 In addition, the Court determined that the punitive nature of the
tax was evident because the Montana Legislature intended for the tax to
serve a deterrent purpose.' 68 The Court, without recognizing or acknowledging that it was doing so, utilized a test that was remarkably similar to the

161. Department of Revenue v. Kurth Ranch, 114 S. Ct. 1937, 1954 (1994) (O'Connor,
J., dissenting).
162. Id.
163. United States v. Halper, 490 U.S. 435, 449 (1989).
164. Id.
165. Id. In Kurth Ranch, Justice O'Connor argued that this bifurcated approach gives
every statute a presumption of constitutionality. Kurth Ranch, 114 S. Ct. at 1954.
166. Kurth Ranch, 114 S. Ct. at 1954. Justice O'Connor noted that the Court of
Appeals "skipped a step in the double jeopardy analysis." Id.
167. Id. at 1946-48.
168. Id. at 1946.
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Kennedy test. 69 However, this article will first focus on whether the
majority properly applied the factors above.
The majority examined the preamble 70 to the Montana Dangerous
Drug Tax Act and determined that it demonstrated an intent to deter people
from possessing marijuana. 171 Chief Justice Rehnquist in his dissent
looked at the same preamble and determined that it demonstrated the
72
legitimate purpose of raising revenue from the profitable drug business.'
Justices Scalia and Thomas, on the other hand, argued that there are two
different standards to be used when attempting to identify the inherent
nature of statutory language. 7 1 Justices Scalia and Thomas asserted that
if the Court is examining a statute to determine if it violates the second
criminal procedure component of the Double Jeopardy Clause, then the
Kennedy-Ward test of "only the clearest proof ' 174 should be used to
establish the unconstitutionality of a statute.' 7' Likewise, if the Court is
examining a statute to determine whether it violates the multiple punishment
component of the Double Jeopardy Clause, a higher level of judicial scrutiny
should be used. 76 Justices Scalia and Thomas then agreed with Chief
Justice Rehnquist that the act demonstrated the legitimate purpose of raising
revenue.177
In the 1922 Child Labor Tax Case, the Court held that the issue of
whether a tax statute is really a tax is a question of statutory construction.
Though the Court has retreated from a position of full judicial
deference, the Court has recognized that statutory construction
still plays an
important role in determining a statute's constitutionality. 79 Thus, statutes

169. See supra note 35 and accompanying text for the Kennedy factors.
170. 1987 Mont. Laws Ch. 563 (preamble) (1987). See supra note 116 for the text of
the preamble.
171. Kurth Ranch, 114 S. Ct. at 1946. "That the Montana Legislature intended the tax
to deter people from possessing marijuana is beyond question." Id.
172. Id. at 1951.
173. Id. at 1959.
174. Id. at 1959 (citing United States v. Ward, 448 U.S. 242, 248-49 (1980)).
175. Kurth Ranch, 114 S.Ct. at 1959.
176. Id. at 1960. It should be noted that Justices Scalia and Thomas contend that what
the majority is really examining in Kurth Ranch is not whether the Tax Act violates the
multiple punishment component of the Double Jeopardy Clause, but rather whether it violates
the second criminal procedure component of the Double Jeopardy Clause. Id. at 1955-61.
177. Id. at 1960.
178. Cf.Child Labor Tax Case, 259 U.S. 20, 36 (1922).
179. Ward, 448 U.S. at 248-49 (holding "only the clearest of proof could suffice to
establish the unconstitutionality of a statute on such a ground [whether the statutory scheme
was so punitive in either purpose or effect]") (citing Fleming v. Nestor, 363 U.S. 603, 617-21
(1960) reh'g denied, 364 U.S. 854 (1960)). See also Mitchell v. Helvering, 303 U.S. 391
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are given a presumption of constitutionality. 8 ° On its face, the preamble
to the Drug Tax Act' 8 1 evinces an intent to raise revenue. The majority
pointed to a section of the preamble that stated that the purpose of the Drug
Tax Act was to "[t]ax those who profit from drug related offenses and to
dispose of the tax proceeds through providing additional anti-crime
initiatives without burdening law abiding taxpayers" as proof that the
legislature intended to deter the possession of dangerous drugs.' 82 The
majority interpreted this section as indicating an
intent to "burden violators
83
of the law instead of law abiding taxpayers." 1
However, the majority is incorrect because the preamble does
demonstrate an overall intent to raise revenue. The legislature, through the
preamble, merely recognized that there is an entire industry that is escaping
ordinary revenue channels while at the same time costing law abiding
taxpayers large amounts of money in the war on drugs.'
The preamble
does not make any reference to burdening violators of the law. Instead, the
preamble indicates an intent to generate revenues from a previously untaxed
source (those who profit from drug related offenses) so that law abiding
taxpayers will not have to face an additional financial burden in order to
fund additional anti-crime initiatives.' 85 If the majority is saying that a tax
(1938).
180. Kurth Ranch, 114 S. Ct. at 1954 (O'Connor, J.,dissenting).
181. 1987 Mont. Laws Ch. 563, (preamble) (1987).
182. Kurth Ranch, 114 S. Ct. at 1947.
183. Id. at n.18.
184. Justice O'Connor referenced a fact sheet put out by the United States Department
of Justice placing the government's expenditure at $27 billion in fiscal year 1991. Id. at
1953.
185. Taxes generated through the Drug Tax Act are to be utilized in the following
manner:
The department shall, in accordance with the provisions of 15-1-501(6), transfer all
taxes collected pursuant to this chapter, less the administrative fee authorized in 1525-111(1), as follows:
(1) one-third of the tax to the credit of the department of
family services to be used for the youth evaluation program and
chemical abuse aftercare programs: and
(2) the remaining two-thirds of the tax proceeds as follows:
(a) one-half to the department of justice to be used:
(i) for grants to youth courts to fund chemical abuse assessments; and
(ii) for grants to counties tO fund services for the detention of
juvenile offenders in facilities separate from adult jails, as authorized in 41-5-1002; and
(b) one-half to the account created by 44-12-206(3) if a state
government law enforcement agency seized the drugs. If a local
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is a burden, and a burden deters, then the majority is doing nothing more
than stating a truism. 6 Thus, in reality the majority offers no support to
demonstrate that the intent of the tax was to deter rather than to generate
revenue. Furthermore, the legislative history of the Drug Tax Act indicates
an intent to raise revenue.' 87 Similarly, the fact that the legislature had
earmarked revenues from the tax for specific anti-crime initiatives.. is
consistent with an intent to raise revenue rather than to deter conduct.
In addition, as Justices Scalia and Thomas noted, the Court has recently
used two different standards when attempting to determine, for double
jeopardy purposes, the inherent nature of statutory language. 8 9 Because
the majority clearly rejected the Halpermode of analysis,"9 it follows that
the Court should have used the Kennedy-Ward test of "only the clearest
proof."' 9' Had the majority applied the Kennedy-Ward test, the majority
could not have possibly concluded that the "Montana legislature intended
that the tax deter people from possessing marijuana."'192 An analysis of
the six different factors the majority used to determine that the Drug Tax
Act violated the Double Jeopardy Clause ban on successive punishments
bears this out.
First, the majority inferred that the tax allowed for sanctions by
restraint of the Kurth's property. 93 The majority noted that if a statute
government law enforcement agency seized the drugs, then that
amount must be credited to the treasurer or finance officer of the
local government, be deposited in its general fund, and be used
to enforce drug laws.
MONT. CODE ANN. 15-25-122 (1987) (amended 1993).
186. See Sonzinsky v. United States, 300 U.S. 506 (1937). In Sonzinsky, the Court
stated, "[elvery tax is in some measure regulatory. To some extent, it imposes an economic
impediment to the activity taxed as compared with others not taxed. But a tax is not any less
a tax because it has a regulatory effect." Id. at 513.
187. The sponsor of the bill, Representative Strizich, was asked whether the statute may
be more appropriately referred to as a penalty. Representative Strizich responded, "When
you are talking about a punitive measure.., that would be entering a whole new ballgame."
Brief for Petitioner at 12, Department of Revenue v. Kurth Ranch, 114 S. Ct. 1937 (1994)
(No. 93-144) (citing the Montana Senate Taxation Committee minutes, March 25, 1987).
188. See supra note 185 for the specific anti-crime initiatives to be funded by revenues
generated from the Drug Tax Act.
189. See supra notes 173-76 and accompanying text. The two different tests are the
Kennedy-Ward test of "only the clearest proof' and the multiple punishment component test
utilized in Halper,requiring a higher level of judicial scrutiny.
190. See supra notes 103-07 and accompanying text.
191. United States v. Ward, 448 U.S. 242, 248-49 (1980). See also Department of
Revenue v. Kurth Ranch, 114 S. Ct. 1937, 1959 (1994) (Scalia, J., dissenting).
192. Kurth Ranch, 114 S. Ct. at 1946.
193. Id. at 1948.
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that amounts to a confiscation of property is unconstitutional, a tax on
previously confiscated goods is at least questionable.' 94 As the majority
noted, the tax was assessed only after the taxpayer had been arrested for
possession of marijuana and the marijuana and related paraphernalia had
been confiscated.195 Thus, for the tax to be assessed, the Kurth's property
had to be restrained. The Bankruptcy Court also had held that the tax was
punitive in nature in part because it allowed for sanctions by restraint of the
Kurth's property."9 The majority then stated that a tax on goods that the
taxpayer no longer possessed had an unmistakably punitive character. 9 7
However, the majority's position is suspect. The majority's inference
that the tax allowed for sanction by restraint of the Kurth's property is
nothing more than acknowledging the practical reality of taxing an illegal
activity. In addition, as Chief Justice Rehnquist noted, the majority certainly
cannot be suggesting that the Kurths be allowed to retain possession of the
contraband.' 98
Second, the majority held that the Drug Tax Act was punitive in nature
because it had been assessed only after the taxpayer had been arrested." 9
The majority also noted that the entire class of people subjected to the Drug
Tax Act are people who have been arrested. 200 The Bankruptcy Court also
held that the Drug Tax Act required a finding of illegal possession of
dangerous drugs. 20 ' However, a close examination of the Montana
Administrative Rules indicate that the tax is imposed on "[e]very person
possessing or storing dangerous drugs, and not authorized to do so by law
....
,202 Thus, the Drug Tax Act does not require an arrest but merely
requires that when the arrest takes place that the return be filed Within the
72 hour period. The fact that the administrative rule is worded in such a
way as to indicate that an arrest may be required is once again nothing more

194. Id. The Court also stated, "[c]uriously, one of the two alternative measures of the
tax is the market value of a substance that cannot legally be marketed." Id.at n.23.
195. Id.
196. Drummond v. Department of Revenue (In re Kurth Ranch), 145 B.R. 61, 76
(Bankr. D. Mont. 1990).
197. Kurth Ranch, 114 S. Ct. at 1948.
198. Id. at 1951 (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting).
199. Id. at 1947. See also Brief for Respondent at 34, Department of Revenue v. Kurth
Ranch, 114 S. Ct. 1937 (1994) (No. 93-144) (citing MONT. ADMIN. R. 42.34.102 (1) (1988)
("This return [the tax assessment sheet] shall be filed within 72 hours of arrest.").
200. Kurth Ranch, 114 S. Ct. at.1947.
201. Drummond v. Department of Revenue (In re Kurth Ranch), 145 B.R. 61, 76
(Bankr. D. Mont. 1990).
202. Brief for Respondent at 34, Department of Revenue v. Kurth Ranch, 114 S. Ct.
1937 (1994) (No. 93-144) (citing MONT. ADMIN. R. 42.34.102 (1) (1988)).
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than acknowledging the practical reality of taxing an illegal activity. As
Chief Justice Rehnquist noted, "[b]ecause the activity sought to be taxed is
illegal, individuals cannot be expected to voluntarily identify themselves as
subject to the tax."2 3 In addition, contrary to the Bankruptcy Court's
finding, and the Court's inference that assessment of the tax required a
finding of scienter,2 4 assessment is not contingent upon conviction.2 5
Because the burden of proof required in a civil matter is lower than the
burden required in a criminal matter, a criminal acquittal would not
necessarily prohibit the imposition of the tax.
Third, the majority determined that the Drug Tax Act promoted the
traditional aims of punishment. 2" The majority stated that the high rate
of taxation and "obvious" deterrent purpose, though not dispositive, are
"consistent with a punitive character. '"2"7 However, in determining that the
tax served the goal of punishment, the Court failed to recognize the criteria
that it had established on prior occasions.
In Halper,the Court stated that a civil sanction constitutes punishment
when the sanction cannot be explained as remedial, "but only as a deterrent
or retribution. '' 20 Similarly, in Austin v. United States,2°9 the Court
relied on Halper to help analyze whether a civil forfeiture violated the
Excessive Fines Clause. The Court stated that the determination would be
based on whether the forfeiture "can only be explained as serving in part to
punish."21
Nevertheless, the majority went through its entire analysis
without ever determining that the Drug Tax Act failed to serve a remedial
purpose. In fact, the Drug Tax Act earmarks collected tax funds for specific
anti-crime initiatives. 1 In Sorensen v. State Department of Revenue,2 12
203. Kurth Ranch, 114 S. Ct. at 1951 n.2 (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting).
204. Drummond, 145 B.R. at 75.
205. Brief for Respondent at 36, Department of Revenue v. Kurth Ranch, 114 S. Ct.
1937 (1994) (No. 93-144) (citing MONT. ADMIN. R. 42.34.105 (1) (1988) ("A criminal
conviction for drug related charges or other charges is not a prerequisite for the tax.").
206. Kurth Ranch, 114 S.Ct at 1948.
207. Id. at 1946.
208. United States v. Halper, 490 U.S. 435, 449 (1989).
209. 113 S.Ct. 2801 (1993). For a general background of the Austin decision, see W.
David George, Note, Finally an Eye for an Eye: The Supreme Court Lets the PunishmentFit
the Crime in Austin v. United States, 46 BAYLOR L. REV. 509 (1994).
210. Austin, 113 S.Ct. at 2806. See also Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520, 539 (1978)
(holding that the "double bunking" of pre-trial detainees does not deprive them of their
liberty without due process). The Court's decision in Bell was based in part on the fact that
if a particular condition or restriction is reasonably related to a legitimate government
objective, it does not amount to punishment.
211. MONT. CODE ANN. § 15-25-122 (1987) (amended 1993). See supra note 185 for
the specific anti-crime initiatives to be funded by revenues generated from the Drug Tax Act.
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the Montana Supreme Court noted that the Department of Revenue used
funds collected from the Drug Tax Act for youth evaluation, chemical after
care, chemical abuse assessments and juvenile detention facilities.2 13 The
Montana Supreme Court determined that these factors exhibited a remedial
purpose.214
Although the Kurth Ranch majority did distinguish Halper, and could
have likewise distinguished Austin as dealing with a civil penalty and a civil
forfeiture respectively, both of these cases can provide the framework within
which to analyze whether a sanction constitutes punishment. The Court
recognized in both cases that civil sanctions (penalties and forfeitures) may
serve both remedial and punitive purposes.2 1 Similarly, in Sanchez the
Court recognized that a tax may serve both remedial and punitive purposes.21 6 Because the Court had not previously subjected a tax statute to
double jeopardy analysis, there were no Supreme Court cases on point. As
such, the Court should have relied on cases that dealt with analogous issues
to determine whether the tax statute at issue in Kurth Ranch constituted a
form of punishment. Halper and Austin are analogous to Kurth Ranch
because all three deal with civil sanctions and in each case, the Court has
recognized that the particular "sanction" may serve remedial and punitive
goals. In Halper and Austin, the Court analyzed the cases from the
perspective that if the sanction can only be characterized as serving punitive
goals, then it must be a form of punishment. 7 Because the tax statute in
Kurth Ranch could have been characterized as also serving a remedial goal,
the tax statute should not have been classified as a form of punishment.
Fourth, the majority's most compelling assertion is that the tax statute
was conditioned on the commission of a crime. 218 The majority reasoned
that because liability for the tax was not assessed until after a crime had
been committed (possession of a dangerous substance) the tax was penal in

212. 836 P.2d 29 (Mont. 1992).
213. Id. at 31.
214. Id.

215. United States v. Halper, 490 U.S. 435, 447 (1989); see also Austin v. United
States, 113 S. Ct. 2801, 2806 (1993).
216. United States v. Sanchez, 340 U.S. 42, 44 (1950). See also Sonzinsky v. United
States, 300 U.S. 506, 513-14 (1937); United States v. Constantine, 296 U.S. 287, 293 (1935);
A. Magnano Co. v. Hamilton, 292 U.S. 40, 47 (1934); J.W. Hampton, Jr., & Co. v. United
States, 276 U.S. 394, 398 (1928).
217. Halper, 490 U.S. at 449; Austin, 113 S. Ct. at 2806.
218. Department of Revenue v. Kurth Ranch, 114 S. Ct. 1937, 1947 (1994). "That
condition is 'significant of penal and prohibitory intent rather than the gathering of
revenue'." Id. (quoting United States v. Constantine, 296 U.S. 287, 295 (1935)).
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nature. The majority's position was consistent with its prior holdings." 9
In Sanchez the court examined a $100 per ounce tax220 on the transfer of
marijuana to a person who had not paid a special tax and registered with the
government. 2 1 . The Court reasoned that since the defendant's "tax liability
does not in effect rest on criminal conduct, the tax can properly be called
' 222
a civil rather than a criminal sanction.
The Kurth Ranch Court then proceeded to analyze the motives behind
taxes.223 The majority noted that when taxes are motivated by a dual
purpose -- to deter a disfavored activity and raise revenue __,224 these
forms of taxes are justified based on the fact that the benefits outweigh the
harms. 225 The majority then stated that the justification for dual purpose
taxes vanish when the taxed activity is illegal.226 Presumably, the majority
was saying that when the taxed activity is illegal, the benefits that justify
dual purpose taxes cease to exist. As such, the tax becomes nothing more
than a form of punishment that may be better served by the imposition of
a fine. Therefore, what the majority is really saying is that contrary to its
holdings in Marchetti v. United States227 and United States v. Constantine,228 the unlawfulness of an activity does prevent its taxation. Chief
Justice Rehnquist noted the majority's inconsistent logic. 22 9 The majority's position is problematic. While the majority pays homage
to its prior
219. See Lipke v. Lederer, 259 U.S. 557, 562 (1922) (holding that taxes imposed by the

National Prohibition Act, upon dealing in liquor prohibited and made criminal by the act, are

in reality a penalty because evidence of a crime is essential). See generally United States
v. One Assortment of 89 Firearms, 465 U.S. 354 (1984); United States v. Ward, 448 U.S.
242 (1980); Kennedy v. Mendoza-Martinez, 372 U.S. 144 (1961); United States v. Sanchez,
340 U.S. 42 (1950); United States v. Constantine, 296 U.S. 287 (1935); United States v. La

Franca, 282 U.S. 568 (1931).
220. I.R.C. § 2590 (a)(2) (since repealed, but last codified at 26 U.S.C. § 4741 (1964)).
221. Sanchez, 340 U.S. at 45.

222. Id.

223. Department of Revenue v. Kurth Ranch, 114 S. Ct. 1937, 1947 (1994).
224. Id. The majority pointed to cigarettes and alcohol as examples of taxes that serve
a dual purpose. Id.

225. Id.
226. Id.
227. 390 U.S. 39 (1968). "The court has repeatedly indicated that the unlawfulness of
an activity does not prevent its taxation." Id. at 44.
228. 296 U.S. 287 (1935). "The burden on the tax may be imposed alike on the just
and the unjust." Id. at 293. See also Thomas H. Leath, Note, 13 N.C. L. REV. 310-17 (1935)
(discussing taxation of liquor dealers during prohibition).
229. Kurth Ranch, 114 S. Ct. at 1950: Chief Justice Rehnquist noted "[t]he Court's
opinion today gives a passing nod to these cases [Manchetti and Constantine], but proceeds
to hold that a high tax rate and a deterrent purpose 'lend support to the characterization of

the drug tax as punishment'." Id.
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holdings that it is proper to tax an illegal activity,23 ° the majority faults the
Drug Tax Act as being conditioned on the commission of a crime.23
Fifth, the Court determined that The Drug Tax Act was punitive in
nature because there was an alternate purpose assignable to it "to deter
'
In essence, the Court agreed with
people from possessing marijuana."232
the Bankruptcy Court that the tax promoted the, "elimination of illegal drug
possession., 233 However, as this article previously noted, the Drug Tax
Act on its face does not exhibit an intent by the legislature to assign an
alternate purpose. 234 If the Drug Tax Act does serve an alternate purpose,
deterring people from possessing marijuana, it must do so in effect.
Nevertheless, this would not be fatal because the Court has consistently
recognized that a tax may deter.2 35 Therefore, although the majority is
correct in stating that the Drug Tax Act will deter people from possessing
marijuana, as the majority noted 236 and prior case law supports, this factor
was not and should not have been dispositive.
Finally, the Court stated that even if it would have been proper to
subject the Drug Tax Act to a Halper analysis, the Department of Revenue
did not claim or prove that the tax assessment remotely approximated or was
roughly related to "the cost of investigating, apprehending and prosecuting,"
the Kurth family. 237 This dicta by the majority is very curious. The Court
initially correctly took the position that Halperdid not provide an appropriate mode of analysis under which to examine the constitutionality of the

230. Id. at 1945.
231. Id. at 1947.
232. Id. at 1946.
233. Drummond v. Department of Revenue (In re Kurth Ranch), 145 B.R. 61, 76
(Bankr. D. Mont. 1990).
234. See supra notes 170-92 and accompanying text for a discussion of the preamble
to the Drug Tax Act.
235. See Department of Revenue v. Kurth Ranch, 114 S. Ct. 1937 (1994). "It is also
firmly established that taxes may be enacted to deter or even suppress the taxed activity."
Id. at 1950 (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting); Minor v. United States, 396 U.S. 87 (1969). "A
statute does not cease to be a valid tax measure because it deters the activity taxed, because
the revenue obtained is negligible, or because the activity is otherwise illegal." Id. at 98
n.13; Sonzinsky v. United States, 300 U.S. 506 (1937). "[A] tax is not any less a tax because
it has a regulatory effect." Id. at 513; Child Labor Tax Case, 259 U.S. 20 (1922). "Taxes
are occasionally imposed in the discretion of the legislature on proper subjects with the
primary motive of obtaining revenue from them and with the incidental motive of
discouraging them by making their continuance onerous." Id. at 38; Veazie Bank v. Fenno,
75 U.S. (8 Wall.) 533 (1869). "The power to tax may be exercised oppressively upon persons
.... I Id. at 548.
236. Kurth Ranch, 114 S. Ct. at 1946.
237. Id. at 1948.
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Drug Tax Act.23 The majority then held that the Drug Tax Act was
unconstitutional based upon the above mentioned factors. 239 Next, the
majority quoted Chief Justice Rehnquist's dissenting opinion that the Halper
analysis "simply does not work in the case of a tax statute."'
Two
sentences later, the Court applied the Halper analysis to the tax statute at
issue. 241 The majority not only inappropriately subjected the tax statute to
Halper analysis, but the Court also improperly applied Halper. The
majority faulted the Department of Revenue for not proving the validity of
the tax assessment in relation to the state's cost even though, per Halper,the
Department of Revenue was not required to provide an accounting until
24 2
after the Kurths "activated" the test.
In addition, assuming arguendo that the Halper test had been properly
activated, there is evidence to suggest that the Department of Revenue
would have been able to meet its burden of providing an accounting.
Justice O'Connor noted that statistics were available to indicate that,
"apprehension, prosecution, and incarceration of the Kurths [would]
cost the
state of Montana at least $120,000. '243 The Bankruptcy Court concluded
that an assessment of $181,000 was authorized under the Drug Tax Act.244
Because Halper allowed for the imposition of a penalty that was "roughly
proportionate" to the damage caused, it would appear that the Drug Tax Act
met the test. 245 Furthermore, on at least two prior occasions, the Court

upheld the validity of a $100 per ounce tax on the transfer of marijuana. 246
The six factors used by the majority are very similar to a test first
advanced in Kennedy.247 The Kennedy test is a compilation of tests that
have been traditionally used to determine whether a proceeding is punitive

238. See supra notes 104-07, 143-65 and accompanying text.
239. Kurth Ranch, 114 S. Ct. at 1948. The majority held, "Taken as a whole, this drug

tax is a concoction of anomalies, too far-removed in crucial respects from a standard tax
assessment to escape characterization as punishment for the purpose of double jeopardy
analysis." Id.
240. Id. at 1948.
241. Id.
242. See supra note 161-166 and accompanying text (discussing Halper as a two part
test).
243. Kurth Ranch, 114 S. Ct. at 1954 (O'Connor, J., dissenting).

244. Id. at 1943.

245. United States v. Halper, 490 U.S. 435, 452 (1989) (Kennedy, J., concurring).

246. See Minor v. United States, 396 U.S. 87 (1969); United States v. Sanchez, 340

U.S. 42 (1950). It should be noted that the Court upheld the validity of a $100 per ounce
tax as measured in 1969 and 1950 dollars respectively.
247. Kennedy v. Mendoza-Martinez, 372 U.S. 144, 168-69 (1963). See supra note 35

for the actual factors in the Kennedy test.
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or civil in nature.248 In Kennedy, the Court examined whether an Act of
Congress that provided for a sanction of forfeiture of citizenship for the
offense of leaving or remaining outside the country to evade military service
was regulatory or penal in nature. Although the Court did not conduct a
detailed examination of the Drug Tax Act based upon the above factors, the
Court did note that application of the factors to the face of the statute did
2 49
The
support the conclusion that the Drug Tax Act was punitive.
have
dispositive,"
nor
exhaustive
Kennedy factors, "while certainly neither
25°
been used by the Court to determine the nature of a proceeding.
In Kurth Ranch, the Bankruptcy Court, after holding that the Drug Tax
Act per Halper was unconstitutional, subjected the Drug Tax Act to the
Kennedy test and determined that the Act had deterrence and punishment as
its purpose.251 It is curious that the Supreme Court used six of the seven
Kennedy factors without ever acknowledging that it was applying the
Kennedy test.25 2 However, just as the Court rejected the Halper analysis
253
on the grounds that Halper dealt with a civil penalty and not a tax, the
Court would have presumably had to reject the Kennedy test as well because
Kennedy dealt with a civil forfeiture and not a tax. 25 This is possibly a
reason why the majority did not mention that it was applying the Kennedy
test.
The majority concluded its decision in Kurth Ranch by noting that
because the proceeding to collect the drug tax was the "functional equivalent
of a successive criminal prosecution" the drug tax "must be imposed during
the first prosecution or not at all."255 This determination by the majority
is curious for two reasons. First, the entire majority analysis proceeded on
the basis that what was being analyzed was whether the imposition of the
Drug Tax Act violated the multiple punishment component of the Double
Jeopardy Clause.256 Because the majority viewed the issue at bar as a

248. Id.
249. Id. at 169.
250. United States v. Ward, 448 U.S. 242, 249 (1980). See also Bell v. Wolfish, 441
U.S. 520, 538 (1979) (stating that the Kennedy factors "provide useful guideposts").
251. Kurth Ranch, 145 B.R. at 75-76.
252. The one factor the Court did not use was whether the sanction "has been
historically regarded as punishment." Kennedy v. Mendoza-Martinez, 372 U.S. 144, 168
(1963).
253. Department of Revenue v. Kurth Ranch, 114 S.Ct. 1937, 1945 (1994).
254. Kennedy, 372 U.S. at 146.
255. Kurth Ranch, 114 S.Ct. at 1948.
256. Id. at 1941 (phrasing the issue as whether the tax violated the constitutional
dissenting)
prohibition against successive punishments). See also id. at 1959 (Scalia, J.,
the
imposition
of
whether
the
basis
on
proceeding
as
analysis
majority's
the
(characterizing
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question of multiple punishment rather than of a successive criminal
prosecution, the majority accorded a lower level of judicial deference to the
Montana legislature. 57 The majority adopted something less than the
Kennedy-Ward test of "only the clearest proof' to establish the unconstitutionality of the Drug Tax Act.258 Therefore, the majority's conclusion that
the proceeding to collect the drug tax was a successive criminal prosecution
was either, just a poor choice of words, or evidence that the majority's
analysis was faulty from the start.
Second, as Justice Scalia noted, the majority's determination that the
drug tax must be imposed during the first prosecution is contradictory to the
majority's earlier assertion that Montana could assess the tax in isolation. 259
However, as Justices O'Connor" and Scalia 26' noted, the
majority's determination that the Montana proceeding to collect the tax was
a successive criminal prosection would effectively bar imposition of the tax
in isolation altogether. To impose the tax would be to require a civil tax
proceeding to provide all of the "criminal-procedural guarantees of the Fifth
2 62
and Sixth Amendments.
Therefore, the majority opinion striking down the Drug Tax Act as
applied was incorrect. The majority employed a faulty analysis of the
preamble to the Dangerous Drug Tax Act because the preamble did evince
an intent to raise revenue. Similarly, to determine that the Drug Tax Act
was punitive in effect, the Court should have accorded a higher level of
judicial deference to the Montana legislature by utilizing the Kennedy-Ward
test of "only the clearest proof." In addition, the six individual factors
(Kennedy factors by disguise) were improperly applied in light of the
Court's prior holdings. Furthermore, the majority's decision that the Drug
Tax Act must be imposed during the first prosecution is not only inherently
inconsistent, but problematic as well. Finally, because the majority opinion

of the Drug Tax Act constituted a form of punishment).
257. Id. at 1959 (Scalia, I., dissenting).
258. Id. Justice Scalia noted in his dissenting opinion that the criteria used to determine
whether a proceeding is criminal is "significantly different (and significantly more deferential
to the government) than the criteria applied in Halper." Id.
259. Id. at 1960. The majority noted, "Montana no doubt could collect its tax on the
possession of marijuana, for example, if it had not previously punished the taxpayer for the
same offense, or, indeed, if it had assessed the tax in the same proceeding that resulted in
his conviction." Id. at 1945.
260. Id. at 1955 (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
261. Id. at 1960 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
262. Id.
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used a multiple punishment level of judicial deference, the opinion does not
provide a workable test for lower courts to follow.2 63
Chief Justice Rehnquist, in a dissenting opinion, correctly agreed with
the majority that Halper should not be controlling. 2" However, although
Chief Justice Rehnquist faulted the majority for using a "hodgepodge of
criteria, '265 the Chief Justice, like the majority, did not provide a workable
test for the lower courts to follow. The Chief Justice analyzed the same
factors2" as the majority and came to the opposite conclusion. 267 The
Chief Justice's opinion did not make any reference to the level of judicial
deference that should have been accorded to the Montana legislature.26
Because Chief Justice Rehnquist phrased the issue as whether the Drug Tax
Act constituted a second punishment, it would appear that he did not use the
Kennedy-Ward test of "only the clearest proof."269 Therefore, because the
Chief Justice used the same test as the majority, albeit to a different result,
his dissenting opinion was incorrect in application but correct in result.
Justice O'Connor, in a dissenting opinion, argued that the majority
should have adapted a Halper mode of analysis. 270 However, as this
article has previously noted,2 Justice O'Connor's position is incorrect.
Although Justice O'Connor would arguably reach the correct result, the test
used to get there would be the incorrect one.
The dissenting opinion of Justice Scalia, with whom Justice Thomas
joined, reached the correct result and utilized the proper test. Justice Scalia
utilized the Kennedy-Ward test of "only the clearest proof' to establish the
unconstitutionality of a statute to determine that imposition of the Drug Tax
Act did not constitute a second criminal prosecution. 272 Although the
majority and Chief Justice Rehnquist both utilized the Kennedy factors,

263. Id. at 1949 (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting). The Chief Justice noted, "[t]he end result
of [the majority's] decision is a hodgepodge of criteria -- many of which have been squarely
rejected by our previous decisions -- to be used in deciding whether a tax statute qualifies
as 'punishment'." Id.
264. Id. at 1949.
265. Id.
266. See supra notes 128-35 and accompanying text (describing the factors).
267. Kurth Ranch, 114 S. Ct. at 1952 (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting).
268. As previously noted, after the Halper decision, there are two levels of judicial
deference to be used when analyzing whether a sanction is punitive in nature. See supra
notes 173-76 and accompanying text. See also Austin v. United States, 113 S. Ct. 2801,
2805 n.6 (1993) (explaining the existence of two levels of judicial deference).
269. Kurth Ranch, 114 S. Ct. at 1950.
270. Id. at 1955 (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
271. See supra notes 143-65 and accompanying text.
272. Kurth Ranch, 114 S. Ct. at 1960 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
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neither accorded the proper level of judicial deference to the Montana
legislature as required by Ward. Because both the majority and the Chief
Justice analyzed the issue from a multiple punishment perspective, both
utilized a standard lower than "only the clearest proof." On the other hand,
Justice Scalia's historical analysis of the multiple punishment component of
the Double Jeopardy Clause led him to the conclusion that the Double
Jeopardy Clause only prohibited multiple prosecutions.273 Therefore, per
Justice Scalia, Halper's lower level of judicial deference was just an
anomaly, and the Kennedy-Ward test should have been used to analyze
whether the imposition of the drug tax act amounted to a successive criminal
prosecution.274
The origin of the multiple punishment component of the Double
Jeopardy Clause can be traced to Ex parte Lange.275 In Lange, the
defendant was indicted "for stealing, purloining, embezzling, and appropriating to his own use, certain mail bags belonging to the post office department. '2 76 The defendant was found guilty in a jury trial. The statute
authorized a punishment of "imprisonment for not more than one year or a
fine of not less than ten dollars nor more than two hundred dollars." 277
The defendant was sentenced to one year imprisonment and to pay a fine of
two hundred dollars.278 The Court, in its analysis, first noted that it would
273. Kurth Ranch, 114 S. Ct. at 1955 (Scalia, J., dissenting). It should be noted that
when Halper was decided, by a unanimous decision, Justice Scalia was a member of the
Court. United States v. Halper, 490 U.S. 435, 436 (1989). In Halperthe Court's analysis
was based on whether the multiple punishment component of the Double Jeopardy Clause
had been violated. Id. at 440. Furthermore, in the Halper opinion, Justice Scalia did not
raise an objection along these lines. However, in Kurth Ranch Justice Scalia offered some
insight as to why his position may have changed when he noted, "[Ro tell the truth, however,
until Halper was decided, extending the 'no-double-punishments' rule to civil penalties, it
did not much matter whether that rule was a free-standing constitutional prohibition implicit
in the Double Jeopardy Clause or (as I think to be the case) merely an aspect of the Due
Piocess Clause requirement of legislative authorization." Kurth Ranch, 114 S. Ct. at 1957.
Justice Scalia went on to note, "[t]he difficulty of applying Halper's analysis to Montana's
Dangerous Drug Tax has prompted me to focus on the antecedent question whether there is
a multiple-punishments component of the Double Jeopardy Clause. [I] have concluded..
that there is not." Id. at 1958.
274. Kurth Ranch, 114 S. Ct. at 1959-60 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
275. 85 U.S. (18 Wall.) 163, (1873). See supra note 20; See also North Carolina v.
Pearce, 395 U.S. 711, 717 n. 1 (1969); Note, Twice in Jeopardy, 75 YALE L.J. 262, 266 n. 13
(1965).
276. Lange, 85 U.S. (18 Wall.) at 164.

277. Id.

278. Id. The Judge imposed the sentence on November 3, 1873. The defendant paid
the fine on November 4, 1873. On November 8, 1873, the defendant was brought before the
Judge who, upon discovering the error, vacated the prior sentence and imposed a new one
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be contrary to the nature of our government to allow an individual to be
twice punished for the same act.Y9 The Court then noted that the trial
court judge imposed two punishments "when it had only the alternative of
one of them," and thus imposed a multiple punishment in excess of his
authority. 28' This fact, combined with the Court's earlier reasoning that
"the Constitution was designed as much to prevent the criminal from being
281
twice punished for the same offense as from being twice tried for it,"
gave rise to the multiple punishment component of the Double Jeopardy
Clause.
The Court in United States v. Benz 282 shed some light on its holding
in Lange. In Benz, the defendant was found guilty of violating the National
Prohibition Act and was sentenced to ten months in prison.283 The federal
district court reduced the term of the defendant's imprisonment from ten to
six months.28 The government objected to the reduction of the sentence
on the grounds that the judiciary had violated the separation of powers by
invading the power to pardon or commute which was vested in the
executive. 285 The Court determined that as a general rule, judgments,
decrees, and orders are within the control of the Courts. 8 6 The court then
cited Lange as standing for the proposition that the rule applied to civil and
criminal cases "provided the punishment be not augmented."2 87 The
Court's interpretation of Lange gives credence to the theory that Lange dealt
not with a multiple punishment issue as it related to the Double Jeopardy
Clause, but rather with whether the trial court judge, by imposing a sentence
greater than the one authorized by the legislature, in essence inflicted a
multiple punishment.

of one year. Thus, the defendant argued that he had already been punished when he paid the
fine. Id.
279. Id. See also supra note 20.
280. Lange, 85 U.S. (18 Wall.) at 174. See also Department of Revenue v. Kurth
Ranch, 114 S. Ct. 1937, 1956 (1994) (Scalia, J., dissenting).
281. Lange, 85 U.S. (18 Wall.) at 173. Justice Scalia argued that the Court's opinion
in Lange can be independently supported by the Due Process Clause. Kurth Ranch, 114 S.
Ct. at 1956. The Due Process Clause would have assured that the legislature had authorized
whatever punishment had been imposed. Id.
282. 282 U.S. 304 (1931).
283. Id. at 306.
284. Id.
285. Id. at 306-07.
286. Id. at 307.
287. Id. The Court went on to state, "to increase the penalty is to subject the defendant
to double punishment for the same offense in violation of the Fifth Amendment." Id.
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In, In re Bradley,'8 the Court again dealt with a situation similar to
Lange.289 The Court held because one of the sentences had been satisfied
(payment of a fine), the trial court could not enforce the imprisonment
portion of the sentence. 290 Had the trial court's sentence been upheld, the
defendant would have been subjected to a multiple punishment because the
Court would have exceeded the legislatively authorized sentence. Similarly,
in Kennedy v. United States,2 9' the court of appeals held that per Lange
a Court may not increase or make more severe a sentence when the
defendant had already satisfied "one of the alternative punishments to which
292
alone the law had subjected him.
29
3
The above cases share two common threads: the sentences imposed
were in excess of that which the legislature had authorized; and the
sentences were imposed after a single criminal proceeding. As Justice
Scalia noted, because the Due Process Clause assures that prior legislative
authorization is obtained for the sentence imposed, the Due Process Clause
alone could have provided the support for the above decisions. 2" In fact,
had the legislature in Lange authorized the imposition of a fine and
imprisonment, the defendant would clearly have been subjected to a multiple
29
punishment, yet there would not have been a constitutional violation. 1
288. 318 U.S. 50 (1943).
289. The Court sentenced the defendant to six months imprisonment and imposed a fine
of $500. The statute only authorized imprisonment or a fine. Id. at 51.
290. Id. at 52.
291. 330 F.2d 26 (9th Cir. 1964).
292. Id. at 27 (holding that judicial error in applying sentences was correctable). See
generally United States v. Adams, 362 F.2d 210 (6th Cir. 1966); United States v. Sacco, 367
F.2d 368 (2d Cir. 1966).
293. Ex Parte Lange, 85 U.S. (18 Wall.) 163 (1873); United States v. Benz, 282 U.S.
304 (1931); In re Bradley, 318 U.S. 50 (1943); Kennedy v. United States, 330 F.2d 26 (9th
Cir. 1964). See supra notes 275-92 and accompanying text.
294. Department of Revenue v. Kurth Ranch, 114 S.Ct. 1937, 1956 (1994) (Scalia, J.,
dissenting). Justice Scalia noted, "The dispositions were entirely consistent with the
proposition that the restriction derived exclusively from the due process requirement of
legislative authorization." Id.
295. Id. at 1957 (citing United States v. DiFrancesco, 449 U.S. 117, 139 (1980)). See
also United States v. Halper, 490 U.S. 435, 451 n.10 (1989) (noting that a legislature may
authorize cumulative punishment under two statutes for a single course of conduct); Whalen
v. United States, 445 U.S. 684, 698 (1979) (Blackman, J.,
concurring) ("I believe that the
Court should take the opportunity presented by this case ... to hold clearly that the question
of what punishments are constitutionally permissible is not different from the question of
what punishments the legislative branch intended to be imposed"); Brown v. Ohio, 432 U.S.
161, 165 (1977) (holding that when consecutive sentences are imposed in a single
proceeding, the constitutional guarantee is "limited" to making sure that the judiciary does
not exceed its legislative authorization by "imposing multiple punishments for the same
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However, had the state attempted to inflict a successive punishment in a
successive criminal proceeding, the Double Jeopardy Clause's prohibition
of successive prosecutions would have protected the defendant.2' Therefore, until Halper was decided, the multiple punishment component of the
Double Jeopardy Clause (if there is one at all) was nothing more than a
judicial tool to assure that the judiciary imposed no more than the legislatively authorized sentence.
In Halper,the Court held for the first time that a civil penalty may be
so punitive in nature as to constitute punishment for the purposes of double
jeopardy analysis.29 7 At the time Halper was decided, the appropriate test
to determine whether the imposition of a civil penalty was punitive in effect
was the Kennedy-Ward test of "only the clearest proof." Because the Halper
Court thought that the criminal prosecution test was too severe, 298 the
Court gave a lower level of judicial deference to the legislature and focused
instead on whether the character of the civil penalty constituted a criminal
punishment. 299 The Court stated that imposition of the civil penalty,
because it was punitive in nature, would constitute a second punishment and
thus violate the Double Jeopardy Clause ban on multiple punishments. 3"
Therefore, the Court focused on the nature of the sanction, whether the civil
penalty served the goals of retribution or deterrence (which is just one factor
of the Kennedy-Ward test), instead of on whether the imposition of the civil
penalty constituted a successive prosecution. 31' The Court simultaneously
accorded a lower level of judicial deference to the legislature by dropping
the "only the clearest proof' test to determine the unconstitutionality of a
statute, and placed a higher level of scrutiny on the effect of the statute
rather than on its intent.30 2
The Halperdecision gave the Double Jeopardy Clause ban on multiple
punishments a whole new look. Although the Court still recognized that the
multiple punishment component assured that the total punishment did not
exceed legislative authorization,30 3 Halper stood for the proposition that
offense.").
296. See Note, Twice in Jeopardy, 75 YALE L.J. 262 (1965).
297. United States v. Halper, 490 U.S. 435, 448-52 (1989). See supra notes 39-53 and
accompanying text.
298. Department of Revenue v. Kurth Ranch, 114 S. Ct. 1937, 1956-60 (1994) (Scalia,
J.,dissenting).
299. Halper, 490 U.S. at 447.
300. Id. at 447 n.7.
301. Kurth Ranch, 114 S.Ct. 1959.
302. Id.
303. Jones v. Thomas, 491 U.S. 376, 381 (1989) reh'g denied, 492 U.S. 932 (1989).
Jones was decided one month after Halper.
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the multiple punishment component may be violated in a subsequent civil
proceeding.3° In Austin v. United States, the Court used the Halper
theory to determine that the excessive fines clause could preclude forfeiture
of property, even if authorized by the legislature in a subsequent civil
proceeding, if the forfeiture was punitive in nature. 30 5 Halper, because of
the lower level of judicial deference it accords to the legislature, expansion
of the multiple punishment doctrine to civil penalties, and erosion of the
staunchness of its core holding by Austin, has the potential to be a pandora's
box of unimaginable proportions.
However, as this article and Justices Scalia and Thomas have noted, the
Double Jeopardy Clause prohibits successive prosecutions, not successive
punishments. 3 7 Because there is not a multiple punishment provision to
the Double Jeopardy Clause, any correct double jeopardy analysis will use
the Kennedy-Ward test to determine whether the successive proceeding is
criminal in nature.0 8 Therefore, Justice Scalia was correct to apply the

304. Id. at 393 (Scalia, J.,
dissenting) (joining Justice Scalia in his dissenting opinion
were Justices Brennan, Marshall and Stevens). See also Austin v. United States, 113 S.Ct.
2801, 2806 n.6 (1993) (stating by inference that Kennedy-Ward is the proper test to use when
analyzing a successive prosecution, but the Halper test should be used when analyzing
whether a punishment is being imposed).
305. Austin, 113 S.Ct. at 2806. It should also be noted, besides extending the multiple
punishment test beyond the context of double jeopardy, the Court in Austin relied on dicta
in Halper to re-interpret the central holding in Halper. In Halper, the Court stated that a
sanction constitutes punishment when it may not, "be characterized as remedial, but only as
a deterrent or retribution." United States v. Halper, 490 U.S. 435, 449 (1989). In Austin,
the Court reinterpreted this to mean that "[w]e, however, must determine that it can only be
explained as serving in part to punish." Austin, 113 S. Ct. at 2806.
306. Justice Scalia noted, "the erroneous holding produces results too strange for judges
to endure, and regularly demands judgements of the most problematic sort." Kurth Ranch,
114 S. Ct. at 1958 (Scalia, J., dissenting). Justice Scalia went on to note, "[i]t
is time to put
the Halpergenie back in the bottle." Id. at 1959. For an in depth look at the strange results
emanating from the Halperdecision, see Elizabeth S. Jahncke, Note, United States v. Halper,
Punitive Civil Fines and the Double Jeopardy and Excessive Fines Clauses, 66 N.Y.U. L.
REV. 112 (1991); and Lynn C. Hall, Note, Crossing the Line Between Rough Remedial
Justice and Prohibited Punishment: Civil Penalty Violates the Double Jeopardy Clause
United States v. Halper, 65 WASH. L. REV. 437 (1990).
307. See supra notes 274-96 and accompanying text. It should also be noted that
Justice O'Connor appears to agree with Justices Scalia and Thomas that the Double Jeopardy
Clause is void of a multiple punishment component. Justice O'Connor notes that a defendant
may not be subjected to a subsequent punitive sanction if he has been punished "because to
do so would be to necessitate a criminal proceeding." Kurth Ranch, 114 S.Ct. at 1953
(O'Connor, J., dissenting).
308. Until Halper, the Court never invalidated a "legislatively authorized" successive
punishment. Kurth Ranch, 114 S.Ct. at 1956.
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Kennedy-Ward test to determine that imposition of the Drug Tax Act did not
constitute a second criminal prosecution. 3"
IV. PRACTICAL IMPLICATION

The Court's decision in Kurth Ranch to strike down the imposition of
the Montana Dangerous Drug Tax Act will have an impact that will be felt
far beyond the state of Montana. First, at its most basic level, the majority's
decision will force the twenty-seven states 310 that have similar drug taxes to
examine the way in which those drug taxes are imposed, if at all. Second,
because the majority's decision in Kurth Ranch fails to provide the lower
courts with a workable test, or with sufficient guidance to determine whether
the imposition of a drug tax violates the Double Jeopardy Clause, it is
probable that the lower courts will reach conflicting results. Finally,
although an overwhelming majority of the Court agreed that Halper was not
controlling,3 ' the Court's decision in Kurth Ranch not only continues to
expand the reach of double jeopardy jurisprudence begun in Halper,but also
provides another case establishing, albeit erroneously, the existence of a
multiple punishment component to the Double Jeopardy Clause.
First, in the aftermath of the Kurth Ranch decision, states will be forced
to closely examine not only when, but also whether to impose their own
brand of the drug tax. In Kurth Ranch the majority held that the drug tax
must be assessed during the first prosecution or not at all.31 2 However,
earlier in its opinion, the majority stated that the tax could have been
imposed if the state had not previously punished the taxpayer. 31 3 Thus,
it appears the majority would be willing to uphold the constitutionality of
the drug tax as applied if it is imposed either in isolation or during the
initial criminal procedure.
However, imposition of the drug tax in isolation is problematic for two
reasons. First, if as the majority contends, the drug tax is "too far removed
in crucial respects from a standard tax assessment to escape characterization
as punishment, 31 4 then it should follow that imposition of the drug tax in
isolation would be unconstitutional because it would violate the procedural
protections provided by the Fifth and Sixth Amendments.3 5 Still, assum309. Id. at 1960.

310. Brief for the States as Amicus Curiae at n.1, Department of Revenue v. Kurth

Ranch, 114 S. Ct. 1937 (1994) (No. 93-144).
311. See supra note 143.
312. Department of Revenue v. Kurth Ranch, 114 S. Ct. 1937, 1948 (1994).
313. Id. at 1945.
314. Id. at 1948.
315. The majority noted that, "[t]he proceeding Montana initiated to collect a tax on the
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ing arguendo that imposition of the drug tax in isolation is not unconstitutional, there is a second problem; a state's imposition of the drug tax may
effectively bar the state's ability to pursue criminal charges for the same
conduct at a later time.31 6 Just as the majority held that imposition of the
Drug Tax Act after the criminal prosecution was unconstitutional, it
presumably would hold that imposition of criminal sanctions after assessment of the Drug Tax Act is unconstitutional as well.317 Since the Kurth
Ranch decision was handed down, it does not appear that the lower courts
have had to deal with the issue of whether assessment of a drug tax may bar
a future criminal sanction for the same conduct. However, in the analogous
area of civil forfeitures, at least three courts citing Halper,Austin and Kurth
Ranch together have, held that a forfeiture of goods may bar a future
criminal sanction.318 Therefore, because imposition of a drug tax may be
unconstitutional or may bar a state from pursuing criminal sanctions at a
later time, states may be reluctant to impose the drug tax in isolation.
Nevertheless, the majority in Kurth Ranch did explicitly hold that the
319
drug tax "must be imposed during the first prosecution or not at all.
However, analyzing the facts behind Kurth Ranch, it is difficult to determine
what the Court would consider as "during the first prosecution." Although
the drug tax was not assessed at the same time that criminal charges were
filed, it was assessed prior to resolution of the charges.320 Still, the fact
that the two proceedings were pending "contemporaneously" did not seem
to satisfy the Supreme Court. 32 ' Therefore, until the Court defines what
constitutes "during the first prosecution" when looking at the multiple
possession of drugs was the functional equivalent of a successive criminal prosecution." Id.
at 1948. See id. at 1955 (O'Connor, J., dissenting); id. at 1960 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
316. As Justice Scalia noted, if the Double Jeopardy Clause does contain a multiple
punishment component, then the order of punishment cannot possibly make a difference. Id.
at 1958.
317. The majority sidestepped this issue by determining that the tax assessment took
place only after the taxpayer had been arrested for the same conduct that gave rise to the tax
obligation in the first place. Id. at 1947 n.21. However, as this article previously noted, the
Drug Tax Act does not require an arrest prior to assessment. See supra notes 200-05 and
accompanying text. Therefore, the majority should have addressed this issue so that the
lower courts would have some guidance.
318. United States v. Torres, 28 F.3d 1463 (7th Cir. 1994); United States v. McCaslin,
863 F. Supp. 1299 (W.D. Wash. 1994); Fant v. State, 881 S.W.2d 830 (Tex. Ct. App. 1994).
319. Kurth Ranch, 114 S. Ct. at 1948.
320. Criminal Charges were filed on October 23, 1987. Brief for Petitioner at 5,
Department of Revenue v. Kurth Ranch, 114 S. Ct. 1937 (1994) (No. 93-144). The Drug
Tax was assessed on December 8, 1987. Id. at 6. The defendants pled guilty on March 25,
1988. Id. at 5. The defendants were then sentenced on July 18, 1988. Id. at 6.
321. Torres, 28 F.3d at 1465.
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punishment component of the Double Jeopardy Clause, states would be well
advised to bring criminal charges and assess any applicable drug taxes at the
same time.
A second potential impact of the Kurth Ranch decision will be
confusion in the lower courts over how to apply Kurth Ranch. This
confusion will emanate from first, the majority's confusion over whether it
was analyzing a multiple punishment or a successive proceeding, and
second, from the majority's use of a highly subjective test. First, as
previously noted in this article, the majority's analysis appears to proceed
from the premise that what was being analyzed was whether the Drug Tax
Act violated the multiple punishment component of the Double Jeopardy
Clause.322 The majority concluded its opinion by noting that imposition
of the Drug Tax Act was the functional equivalent of a "successive criminal
prosecution."323 Thus, lower courts will be left to independently determine
whether the Court was utilizing a successive prosecution/proceeding test or
a multiple punishment test. Because the two tests accord a different level
of judicial deference to the legislature,3 this determination is crucial.32
Next, the lower courts are likely to reach conflicting results in the
application of Kurth Ranch. As Chief Justice Rehnquist noted, the
majority's test is a "hodgepodge of criteria--many of which have been
squarely rejected by our previous decisions--to be used in deciding whether
a tax statute qualifies as 'punishment'. 3 26 Determining whether the
legislature intended for a tax to serve a deterrent purpose, whether a tax is
only assessed after arrest, whether a tax promotes the aims of punishment,
whether a tax is conditioned on commission of a crime, and whether a tax
will deter people are all subjective factors. Although these same factors are
322. See supra notes 255-58 and accompanying text.
323. Id.
324. For an overview of the difference between the two tests, see supra notes 173-77
and accompanying text.
325. At least one court in the aftermath of Kurth Ranch has viewed Kurth Ranch as
holding "that a proceeding . . . to collect a tax . . . was the functional equivalent of a
successive criminal prosecution." United States v. 4204 Thomdale Ave., No. 92-C#3744,1994 U.S. Dist. Lexis 17415 at *32 (N.D. Ill. Nov. 23, 1994). Presumably, if a lower court
does determine that the majority in Kurth Ranch was analyzing a successive prosecution, then
that court must attempt to apply the multiple punishment lower level of deference test. The
possibility does exist that in reality the majority was discarding the Kennedy-Ward test which
is used to determine the inherent nature of a proceeding and replacing it with a multiple
punishment test. If this is the case, then Kurth Ranch has expanded the scope of the Double
Jeopardy Clause far beyond Halper or Austin. However, this scenario seems unlikely.
326. Department of Revenue v. Kurth Ranch, 114 S. Ct. 1937, 1949 (1994) (Rehnquist,
C.J., dissenting); see also supra notes 167-68 and accompanying text for a list of the factors
upon which the majority relied.
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used to determine the inherent nature of a proceeding,327 when used in that
capacity a higher level of judicial deference is accorded.32 Because the
multiple punishment component accords a lower level of judicial deference
to the legislature and requires something less than "only the clearest
proof'329 to overturn the presumption of constitutionality attached to a
statute, judges will in effect be allowed to sit as a super legislature.33 °
Therefore, because lower courts must first attempt to determine what the
majority in Kurth Ranch was analyzing, and then apply the highly subjective
criteria utilized by the majority, the lower courts will reach confusing and
conflicting results when applying Kurth Ranch.
Finally, the Court's decision in Kurth Ranch will not only extend the
reach of the Double Jeopardy Clause, but will also force the Court to one
day consider the antecedent question of whether there is a multiple
punishment component at all. Although the Court in Kurth Ranch
determined that Halper was not controlling,331 the Court's decision in
Kurth Ranch extended the reach of the Double Jeopardy Clause.332
Combined, Halper,Austin, and Kurth Ranch stand for the proposition that
the name attached to a sanction is irrelevant. 333 More importantly though,
is that in all three cases the Court focused not on whether the proceeding
was of a punitive nature, but on whether the sanction constituted a multiple
punishment. Thus, in all three cases, the Court rejected the Kennedy-Ward
"only the clearest proof' test and adopted a multiple punishment test that
accords a lower level of judicial deference to the respective legislatures.
However, what the Court should focus on is whether there is a multiple
punishment component to the Double Jeopardy Clause. For now it appears
327. Kennedy v. Mendoza-Martinez, 372 U.S. 144, 168-69 (1963).
328. See supra notes 173-77 and accompanying text.
329. See supra notes 189-91 and accompanying text.
330. In the aftermath of Kurth Ranch, at least one court has already examined a drug
tax similar to that in Kurth Ranch and reached an opposite result. Milner v. State,
AV93000716, 1994 Ala. Civ. App. Lexis 579 *6-7 (Ala. Civ. App. Dec. 2, 1994).
331. See supra note 143 (noting that eight of the nine justices agreed that Halper did
not apply).
332. Justice O'Connor noted that the majority's decision was an "unwarranted expansion
of our double jeopardy jurisprudence". Department of Revenue v. Kurth Ranch, 114 S.Ct.
dissenting). In addition, at least two cases decided after
1937, 1955 (1994) (O'Connor, J.,
Kurth Ranch have read Halper, Austin, and Kurth Ranch as one, all extending double
jeopardy jurisprudence. See State v. Walker, 646 A.2d 209, 211 n.2 (Conn. App. Ct. 1994)
(stating that,"While we note that Halper was initially limited to a 'rare case,' the Supreme
Court has recently extended that holding in [Kurth Ranch]"); United States v. Torres, 28 F.3d
1463, 1465 (1994) (noting "that after Halper,Austin and Kurth Ranch the nomenclature of
'civil' does not carry much weight.").
333. Torres, 28 F.3d at 1465.
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that the Court, by fiat, has decided there is. 334 However, at least three
Justices have adopted the position that there is not. 335 Although neither
the Chief Justice nor the majority addressed this issue, the possibility of
addressing- it has not been foreclosed. Since the decision in Kurth Ranch,
at least one state supreme court and one district court have noted that there
336
is not a multiple punishment component to the Double Jeopardy Clause.
V. CONCLUSION

In Department of Revenue v. Kurth Ranch, the United States Supreme
Court, for the first time, held that the assessment of a state's drug tax
against a defendant that has been criminally punished violated the Double
Jeopardy Clause. The Court correctly determined that Halper was not
controlling. However, the majority then erred by not applying the KennedyWard test of "only the clearest proof' to determine whether the assessment
of the tax was punitive, and instead, adopted a multiple punishment test to
determine whether the tax itself was punitive. In ruling that the tax
amounted to a second punishment in violation of the multiple punishment
component of the Double Jeopardy Clause, the Court continued a recent
trend of expansion of the Double Jeopardy Clause started in Halper and
refined in Austin.
The Court's decision will have an impact on the way states assess drug
taxes. Because twenty-seven states have drug taxes similar to the one in
Kurth Ranch, the Court's decision has the potential to be far-reaching. In
addition, Kurth Ranch does not provide a workable test for lower courts to
follow.
That a new trend is emerging in double jeopardy jurisprudence in
relation to the multiple punishment component of the Double Jeopardy
Clause appears certain. Whether the trend of focusing on the punishment
rather than on the nature of the proceeding will continue to evolve can only
be answered if and when the Supreme Court considers Justice Scalia's

334. Cf.United States v. Halper, 490 U.S. 435 (1989); Austin v. United States, 113 S.
Ct. 2801 (1993); Department of Revenue v. Kurth Ranch, 114 S.Ct. 1937 (1994).
335. Justice Scalia and Thomas have explicitly stated that there is not. Kurth Ranch,
114 S. Ct. at 1958. Justice O'Connor also appears to agree with this position. Id. at 1953.
336. People v. Vaughn, 524 N.W.2d 217, 233 n.7 (Mich. 1994) (holding that "[t]he
Double Jeopardy Clause only serves as a restraint on the prosecutor and the courts, it does
not limit the punishment authorized by the legislature"); United States v. Haywood, 864 F.
Supp. 502, 505 (W.D.N.C. 1994) (noting, "[t]his court is of the opinion that these words
[Fifth Amendment], . . .did not contemplate the prohibition of multiple punishments, but
merely multiple prosecutions").
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antecedent question of whether the Double Jeopardy Clause even has a
multiple punishment component.
DENIS M. GRAVEL

